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THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FACIAL EXPRESSION OF EMOTION
I ntroduct ion
The study of facial expression of emotion integrates two areas of
theory and research, emotion and nonverbal behavior. in the last 15
years, a revival of interest and research activity has boosted the
development of these two areas in both of which facial expression is one
of the very fertile fields of work. Moreover, the rediscovery of facial
expression a century after the pioneering work of Darwin (1872) is often
considered to have catalyzed the renewed interest in emotion. Indeed,
elaborating on Tomklns' original idea of the central role of facial
expression in emotion, Ekman's and Izard's transcu I tura I studies of
facial expression spurred a new line in the development of emotion models
(Ekman, 1984).
To begin of the study of emotional facial expression development,
fundamental questions which underlie this whole field of research must to
be introduced: Can we define emotion? What constitutes nonverbal facial




Many authors have sought, but no one has found an acceptable
definition for the concept of emotion. These repeated failures raise the
question of whether such a definition is possible. It is now commonly
accepted that no definition of emotion can be established, at least in





1982; Fehr & Russell, 1984). Emotion is then
currently defined as an organized set of events, none of which is either
necessary or sufficient. For example, Fehr and Russell (1984) have
approached the definition of emotion from a prototypic perspective. In
their view, for emotion (as well as for the prototypic categor ies
described by Rosch and Mervis, 1975), membership is a matter of degree
rather than an all or nothing situation, and no sharp boundaries separate
members from nonmembers. Similar I ly, Aver i I I (1982) defines the concept
of emotion through an analogy to the concept of syndrome. As a syndrome,
an emotion has a distinctive internal structure and can be identified,
but is rarely defined by a set of necessary and sufficient attributes.
Numerous other authors similarly espouse a composite definition of
emotion (Izard, 1977; Scherer
,
1984; Plutchik, 1980; Leventhal, 1979).
Thus, based on an emergent consensus of many theorists, the concept
of emotion, as used in this thesis, refers to an entire syndrome of
different "symptoms" including neurophys io log i ca I , motor-expressive, and
phenomeno log i ca I components (Izard, 1977). The phenomeno log i ca
I
component is defined as the subjective experience of emotion that is
motivating or that has immediate meaning for the individual. The motor-
expressive component consists primarily of patterned facial movements and
secondarily of postural and vocal responses. Finally, the
neurophysiological component includes electrochemical activities and
autonomous nervous system changes occurring during emotion. As stated
above, none of these components is singly necessary or sufficient unto
itself in establishing emotion.
Once emotion has been defined, different perspectives can be taken
for Its study. Roughly, three main perspectives or level of analysis are
reported in the literature. According to the theorist's inclination, any
emotional event can be analyzed from a biological, psychological, or
social perspective.
The biological system of analysis mainly refers to the laws of
evolution and to the information encoded in the genetic material. For
example, facial expressions of emotion can be analyzed from the
perspective of their meaning for the evolution and survival of the
species. The psychological system of analysis considers the cognitive
schemas acquired during the Idiosyncratic history of the individual
through learning and as a function of experience. The concept of
cognitive schema, as used in this context, must be understood in the
broad sense of systems of internal representation by the individual about
emotion. The psychological system of analysis investigates how an event
makes sense in the individual's history. Finally, the social system of
analysis uses the rationale of the sociological analysis, employing the
central concepts of cultural rules, norms, roles, and regulative social
mechanisms. The meaning of emotion is considered from the perspective of
its social function. For example, grief can be analyzed as a set of
behaviors regulated by the social norms of mourning, a behavior which has
a specific social function and assigns a determined social role to the
i nd i v i dua I .
Within each of these three perspectives, the object of analysis can
vary in generality, ranging from the most inclusive to the most specific
unit. For example, studying facial expression from a biological
perspective, one can focus on the adaptive value of a given facial
display for the species (Inclusive unit), or on some fixed, reflex-like,
facial actions pattern In response to a specific stimulus (specific
unit). The different levels of generality of the object of analysis can
be ordered in a hierarchy. The distinctions between these different
perspectives and objects of analysis will be used to compare and contrast
the different theories of facial expression development.
In sum, emotion has been tentatively defined as a composite concept
articulating neuro-phys io log i ca I
,
motor-expressive, and phenomeno log I ca I
components. Historically, three different perspectives have been used to
analyze emotion; the biological, psychological, and social perspective.
Finally, within each perspective the specificity of the object of
analysis can vary.
Facial expression of emotion
In considering the concept of facial expression of
its facets must be discussed: the nature of facial
nonverbal behavior and Its relationship to emotion.
emot ion , two of
expression as a
Facial expression as a nonverbal behavior
Being the center of visual attention in most interaction, the face
is the most visible aspect of nonverbal behavior. As any nonverbal
behavior, facial activity has been described as expressive by some or as
communicative by others (Buck, 1984). The choice between these two
alternatives depends in fact, on the importance that one attributes to
intent ional ity in the definition of communication. More specifically,
the issue of i ntent iona
I
i ty generates the distinction between spontaneous
and voluntary expression. Buck (1984), defining communication broadly as
any behavior of an individual influencing the behavior of another
Individual, distinguishes between spontaneous and symbolic communication.
Spontaneous communication non- i ntent iona I I y transmits biologically shared
signs, while symbolic communication voluntarily transmits a specific
message contained in socially defined symbols. Thus, if one admits that
intent ional i ty Is not a defining attribute of communication, any facial
behavior is potentially communicative.
Facial expression and emotion
With a practically infinite number of combinations of several dozen
different muscle movements, facial expression is the most differentiated
element of the motor-expressive component of emotion. Because of this
potentiality, facial expression has been investigated in a wealth of
studies, while other elements of emotional expression like voice or
posture have received little attention from researchers. As a
consequence, facial expression is often equated incorrectly with the
expressive component of emotion.
However, a good deal of controversy persists about the exact nature
of facial expression and its relationship to emotion. indeed for some
theorists, facial expression holds a central place in emotional
processes. For others, facial expression is Just a peripheral
phenomenon. In the last decade, the debate about the role of facial
expressive behaviors in emotion has been centered on the facial feedback
hypothesis. In its most general formulation this hypothesis holds that
the subjective experience of emotion is derived from facial expressions.
Various authors have proposed different types of feedback; feedback from
the efferent muscular nerves (Izard, 1977), or from differences In the
vascular irrigation of the brain resulting from the constriction of blood
vessels by the facial muscles (Zajonc, 1984). The reality of facial
feedback is still debated on empirical and experimental grounds, although
the weight of the evidence favors the proponents of the facial feedback
hypothesis (Laird, 1984; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979).
Similar My, controversy persists about the constancy of the
relationship between facial expression and underlying internal states.
While some authors stress the relative indepedence of facial expression
from internal states (Lewis & Michalson, 1983), others emphasize a
consistent cor respondance between facial expressions and internal states
(Ekman, 1984). Also, from a developmental perspective, some authors
report changes over time in the coordination between expressive behavior
and affective states (e.g., Zlvin, 1986a). Depending on the stage of
development, a specific internal state may be expressed by different
facial expressions.
Facial expression also plays an important role in the debate about
the concept of "fundamental emotion". This concept refers to basic pan-
human emotions inherited from the phylogenetic history of the species.
The experience and expression of fundamental emotions are independent
from the culture and do not require any type of learning; they constitute
a biological given. Authors like Izard (1977) or Ekman (1984) have
defended the existence of at least seven fundamental emotions: happiness,
sadness, fear, anger, surprise, disgust, and contempt. Their principal
evidence rests on findings of universally expressed and recognized facial
expressions in specific emotional situations. The issue of the
fundamental emotion raises the question of the extent to which facial
expression of emotion is the product of innate biological forces or is
learned and relative to a specific culture. As one would expect, there
is a consensus maintaining the interaction of both factors in producing
facial expression. However, large differences persist among theorists in
terms of the weight they attribute to each factor.
Cone I us ion
This Introduction addresses numerous questions and issues which
underlie the field of facial expression of emotion. All of these issues,
as well as the definitional problems of emotion, will be debated in the
six theories of the development of facial expression of emotion reviewed
in the next section. In presenting each theory, special attention will
be given to determining how emotion and facial expression are defined and
related to one another, and which perspective is used to analyze them.
More specifically, the issue of nature versus nurture, spontaneous versus
8voluntary expression, and the function of facial expression In the
emotional system will be discussed.
Six Theories of the Development of Facial Expression
Historically, two general models of the development of facial
expression of emotion have been proposed, in the first model, which will
be named the "differentiation model", the ontogenesis of facial
expression is depicted as a gradual evolution and differentiation of
facial displays over time. As presented by Bridges (1930), this scheme
maintains that the infant at birth displays only general excitement.
Within a short period of time however, this behavior differentiates into
clear signs of distress and delight. After some months fear, disgust,
and anger displays develop out of distress, and elation and affect
displays out of delight. From these, other more complex displays are
differentiated. In the second model, which will be referred to as
"discrete onset model", facial expressions are genetically pre-wired and
appear full-blown at specific points of development during the process of
maturation. This model, originated by Tomkins (1962), implicates the
universality of facial expression.
This section presents the six major contemporary models of the
ontogenesis of facial expression of emotion which elaborate upon the two
prototyplc models just Introduced. The first three models, developed by
Buck, Izard, and Ekman, commonly emphasize a biological system of
analysis and employ a discrete onset model, but each of them has its
specific perspective. Buck develops the neurological and cerebral
aspects of the development of facial expression. Izard situates facial
expression within an extensive theory of emotion. Ekman, introducing the
concept of cultural display rules, makes a link between the biological
and social perspectives.
The fourth model, of Emde, and the fifth, of Sroufe, present the
alternative of a psychological system of analysis. While Emde presents a
psychoanalytic point of view of the ontogenesis of facial expression
still rooted in biological basis, Sroufe elaborates on the original
differentiation model of Bridges (1930). Finally, in the sixth model
,
Lewis develops a social analysis of the development of facial expression
of emot ion
.
The same rationale as that developed in the introduction is used to
present each model. The model's definition of emotion will first be
presented. Then, the relationship between emotion and facial expression
will be clarified, and finally, the model's scheme for the development of
facial expression will be exposed in detail.
Buck: an evolutionary model
Buck's main areas of interest are nonverbal communication, human
motivation, and emotion. He recently published an integrative theory of
emotion (Buck, 1985) and a handbook on the communication of emotion
(Buck, 1984). In his work he encompasses concerns of social and
developmental psychology and ethology of communication.
10
What i s emot ion?
According to Buck (1985), primary motivational/emotional systems or
"primes" under ly emotions. Primes have evolved through the entire
phylogenetic history of the human species as systems of behaviors that
respond to challenging stimuli In ways that are adaptive. First, they
emerged to serve the basic functions of bodily adaptation and maintenance
of homeostasis. Later, primes developed to assure an efficient
communication and behavior coordination with other conspecif ics,
mechanisms necessary for social regulation and sexual reproduction (Buck,
1984)
.
Each prime serves a specific function for the species (Buck, 1985).
They are based on innate mechanisms organized within identifiable
subcortical and pa leocort I ca I regions of the brain. (Buck (1984, p. 78-
87) describes the specific cerebral localizations of the primes). Primes
require some particular internal or external stimulation to become
activated. Relevant learning can influence or modify the way primes
operate
.
Emotion and motivation are two aspects of the primes. Motivation is
the potential for behavior inherent in the neurochemical structures of
the primes, and emotion involves the means by which that potential is
realized, or readout, when activated by a challenging stimulus. Thus, to
each emotion corresponds an analogous motivation. Buck (1985) clarifies
this distinction with the analogy of the relation between matter and
energy in physics: Just as energy is the potential that manifests itself
in matter, motivation is a potential that manifests itself in emotion.
11
Primes exist at different levels of organization, ranging from
simple reflexes to more e I aborate pr imary affects
. The latter includes
happiness, fear, anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust. The capacity to
experience these affects is innate and unlearned. Each primary affect is
associated with a specific facial expression.
Emotions have evolved as readout mechanisms carrying information
about the states of the primes. Three readout mechanisms can be
identified: Emotion I, Emotion II, and Emotion III. Each is associated
with a specific type of emotional response (Buck, 1983, 1985).
Emotion I involves the systems directly responsible for bodily
adaptation and the maintenance of the homeostasis. Emotion I is
responsible for the visceral reactions of emotion.
Emotion II is an external readout which reflects the states of the
primes in overt expressive behavior. Emotion II organizes the facial
propr iocept I ve feedback
.
Emotion III is a direct cognitive readout of the primes into
consciousness. It involves syncretic as opposed to analytic cognition.
Syncretic cognition is associated with the right hemisphere and refers to
a holistic conceptualization in which sensory and cognitive elements are
fused or synthesized Into a global experience (Werner, 1957, cited in
Buck, 1984). Emotion III constitutes an unmediated subjective experience
of the emotional states. Evidence for a direct readout into
consciousness are offered by brain stimulation studies that have produced
integrated emotional states in subjects.
The subjective experience resulting from emotion III can be
appraised and labeled by the cognitive system (analytic cognition). None
12
of these readouts is either sufficient or necessary to produce emotional
experience. Their relative contribution to the emotional process depends
on the individual, the situation, and the primes involved.
The status of facial expression in emotion
Facial expression is a product of emotion II. Although it does not
constitute a necessary or sufficient element, facial expression
contributes to the emotional experience (Buck, 1985). This external
readout of the primes is based on innate neural programs based In the
upper brain stem. Facial expressions can, however, be modified by
display rules which are the social codes that control the facial
displays. Buck (1984) refers to displays as behavioral patterns that
have evolved as signals in the service of social coordination. In sum, a
given facial expression has two potential determ i nents : The innate
biological programs and the social rules governing nonverbal expression.
Thus, as described in the introduction, Buck (1984) distinguishes
between spontaneous and symbolic communication. Spontaneous
communication is biologically shared as part of the phylogenetic heritage
of the species. It occurs automatically, without voluntary control.
Symbolic communication is socially shared and voluntary: The sender
intends to send a specific message via a symbolic code. Symbolic
communication influence increases through the phylogenetic and
ontogenet i c sea I e
.
Hence, there are two sources of facial expression: a spontaneous
source which is a readout of the emotional state itself, and a symbolic
source which is the state that the subject intends to convey and which is
13
controlled by the display rules. The neural pathways control I ing the
facial musculature are different whether the expression is spontaneous or
symbolic. The former is controlled by the pyramidal motor system, and
the latter by the non pyramidal motor system (Buck, 1984).
Buck (1984) proposes parallel mechanisms for decoding facial
expression. For spontaneous facial expression, the decoding mechanisms
are direct built-in processes with evolutionary roots analogous to the
roots of the sending processes. Spontaneous facial expression acts like
an ethological releaser. For the symbolic aspects of facial expression,
the decoding processes are mediated by decoding rules, guided by cultural
norms
.
Model of the facial expression process
As shown in figure 1, the motor control of facial expression is
monitored in the lower brain stem (1). This center can be activated by
two mechanisms:
(a) Voluntary expression mechanisms are initiated in the precentral motor
cortex, more precisely in the facial area (4). They operate via
cor t i cobu I bar fibers (dashed lines).
(b) Hard wired facial expression mechanisms are based in the upper brain
stem (2). These mechanisms can be activated either by emotional systems
in the hypotha I am i c/ I imb i c system (cross-hatched area) for spontaneous
expression, or by a system of voluntary facial expression initiation.
Buck (1984) suggests that this voluntary initiation mechanism is
associated with the cingulate cortex and/or the supplemental motor area
above the cingulate gyrus (3).
FIGURE 1
Neural Pathways of Emotional Expression
(From Buck, 1984, p. 99)
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Hence, innate and universal patterns of facial expressions can be
activated by two mechanisms: The automatic readout of emotion II and a
voluntary initiation. Thus people can pose universally recognized facial
expressions or use these hard wired expressions In the flow of symbolic
commun I cat ion
.
Buck does not propose a parallel model for the decoding of facial
expressions. However, he reports evidence, from studiess of brain-
damaged patients, of the importance of the right hemisphere for facial
expression recognition (Buck, 1984).
The ontogenesis of facial expression
Maturation and development of emotion ll . To explain the
development of emotion, Buck (1983, 1984) borrows concepts from two
authors, Harlow and Plaget. As Piaget's concepts are mainly used to
provide an account of the ontogenesis of the subjective experience of
emotion, they will not be developed here.
In his ontogenetic analysis of emotional expression, Buck refers to
Harlow's studies on the social development of rhesus monkeys (Harlow,
1971). Harlow (1971) proposes that the emotional system develops in a
fixed sequence determined by the biological maturation of the
neurochemical structures underlying emotion. However, the infant has to
deal with emotion and its communication through social experience which
are normally coordinated with the maturational sequence. Indeed,
heredity transmits only elementary forms of communication which require
learning to function effectively.
16
in his "affect ional system" theory, Harlow (1971) proposes three
stages In the social and af feet I ve deve lopment of the rhesus monkey
.
Each stage Is constituted by a critical period where social experience
and maturat ional sequence are coordinated and facial expressions appear
at the stage where they are funct lona I I y adapt I ve . According to Buck
(1983, 1984), these stages can also be observed in the human infant.
During the first stage, the infant develops the "maternal
affectlonal system". Warm contacts with the mother establish a
fundamental trust and attachment which constitute the basis for the
infant's exploration behavior and progressive independence from the
mother. At this stage, the infant expresses pain and curiosity. During
the second stage, the "peer affectlonal system" period, the infant is
confronted with social relations with peers or strangers. Fear and
aggression appear. In Rhesus monkeys, a third stage can be observed: The
"heterosexual affect ional system" period. However, in human development,
this stage has no parallel because of the emergence of language and
because of the long period of maturation before puberty.
Drawing on Piaget, Buck (1984) reports similar key concepts of an
ontogenesis unfolding through a sequence of stages, where the integration
of particular social experiences Is a pre-requisi te.
Once established, these primary emotion systems and their
corresponding spontaneous facial patterns do not undergo any further
change. However, under the effect of socialization the symbolic aspects
of facial expression continue to develop. The respective influence of
spontaneous and symbolic communication in facial expression during the
17
ontogenesis is illustrated by figure 2. This pattern retraces as well
the phylogenetic pattern of nonverbal communication.
§2£laJ learning
.
Buck (1984) suggests that the kind of
socialization that can affect a behavior is determined by its
accessibility. The access i b I I i ty of a behav ior i s the degree to wh i ch
this behavior is available via sensory channels to others and to the
individual who performs it. The spontaneous expressive tendencies and
the symbolic communication aspect of facial expression differ In
accessibility and thus they undergo different socialization processes.
Intentional facial expression (symbolic communication) can be
trained via imitation and social reinforcement. Buck (1983, 1984) also
emphasizes the Importance of language as a new system of behavior control
which Is functionally independent from the biological system upon which
it is based. Language allows expressive behavior to come in conformity
with culture, and to be under the control of the principles of logic and
reason i ng
.
To the extent that facial expression is spontaneous, it simply
reflects the actual states of the primes. By definition, the senders
have no control over spontaneous expression, and, furthermore, they are
often unaware of their facial expression. But accessibility is also
susceptible to learning, and individuals can and do learn impression
management techniques to control their spontaneous expressions.
In sum, while the ontogenesis of facial expression is mainly
determined by maturational factors, symbolic facial expression evolves in
parallel as a function of social experience, cognitive development, and
language acquisition.
FIGURE 2






Buck (1984) does not elaborate upon the development of decoding
abilities. However, he does point out that nonverbal sensitivity
increasingly improves with age, in part because ch I Idren acqui re the
cultural rules and expectations about the interpretation of emotional
displays. They also learn to rely more heavily on leakier, less
controllable nonverbal channels In cases in which discrepancies are
perceived In the nonverbal message.
Cone I us ions
Buck definitively considers emotion and the development of facial
expression from a biological perspective. The mechanisms and functions
of both of these concepts are inherited from the phylogenetlc history.
Specific facial expressions have been selected for their adaptive value
of communicating internal states to other conspec I f I cs . Yet, facial
expression is not a necessary component of emotion.
In Buck's theoretical construct, spontaneous facial expression of
emotion appears early In life, in a discrete sequence controlled by the
maturation of the subcortex. However, to be functional, this biological
basis must be activated by specific social interactions. Later, through
the processes of socialization, children learn to control their facial
express ions
.
Nesting development of facial expression of emotion within his
global theory of emotion, Buck offers a very comprehensive perspective.
His model integrates concerns from theories of emotion and motivation,
nonverbal behavior, ethology of communication, and ethology. He nicely
distinguishes between spontaneous and voluntary facial expression, and
20
their neurological basis. His is the only deve lopmenta i model of facial
expression to consider both encoding and decoding and to clearly
differentiate their ontogenesis, although he develops the encoding
aspects of facial expression more than the decoding aspects.
Unfortunately, the developmental processes are presented in a very
broad manner and only general outlines are given. Also, the concept of
spontaneous versus voluntary expression appears very dichotomous. It is
not clearly delineated how both aspects interact to produce observed
real-life facial expressions.
In sum, certain characteristics of the eliciting situation and the
pattern of the corresponding facial expression are biological ly given.
In the course of development, voluntary expression is learned through
specific socialization processes as a parallel system.
Izard: a neuro-motor model
The work of Izard has influenced the last 20 years of theory and
research in the fields of emotion and facial expression. Izard has
developed Tomklns's (1962) notion that facial expression originates the
subjective experience of emotion. Similar to, yet independent of Ekman,
Izard established the existence of pan-human emotions. His more recent
work concentrates on the development of facial expressions, specially in
young infants.
21
What i s emot ion?
In Izard's theoretical framework, the concept of emotion is placed
within a broader system: personality.
| Zar d (1978a, 1979a, 1984)
conceives of personality as a complex organ I zat I on of six interrelated
subsystems: the homeostatic, drive, motor
, perceptua
I ,
cogn i t i ve , and
emotion subsystems. Although they have different functions, most of the
time these subsystems operate in interaction. Hence, the emotion
subsystem cannot be studied in isolation (Izard, 1984).
Al
I
personal I ty subsystems comprise a minimal set of genet i ca I I
y
encoded programs. This set constitutes the basis of the further
elaboration and development of personality. Still, the subsystems are
not present equally developped at birth, and each of them has its own
rate of development. In Izard's view, the emotion subsystem Is the
primary motivational system for human beings, and therefore is the major
determinant of the personality functions (Izard & Buechler, 1980).
Izard (1977, 1978a) defines the emotion subsystem as a complex
process with neurophys lo log I ca I , neuromuscular and phenomeno log i ca
I
components. The phenomeno log I ca I component is essentially the emotional
subjective experience that is motivating or that has immediate meaning or
significance for the person. The neuromuscular level consists primarily
of patterned facial activity and secondarily by postura I -gestur a I
,
visceral-glandular and vocal responses. Finally, the neurophys io log i ca
component Includes (a) patterned electrochemical activity in the nervous
system, particulary in the cortex, the hypothalamus, and the limbic
system (b) the neural structures involved in the facial feedback and (c)
the autonomic nervous system changes occurring during emotion.
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None of these components alone is sufficient to produce emotion; all
three components must be activated (Izard & Buechler, 1980). The
processes whereby these interactions are regulated have been selected for
and developed through our phylogenetic history (Izard, 1977).
Izard (1977, 1978b) identifies ten fundamental emotions: interest,
Joy, surprise, anger, distress, disgust, contempt, fear, shame/shyness,
and guilt. The "fundamental" character of these emotions is defined by a
set of properties. Fundamental emotions have innately determined neural
mechanisms for their expression and experience. Thus, a specific
fundamental emotion has a characteristic facial expression and a
distinctive subjective quality. The neural mechanisms for the perception
of fundamental emotions are also innate. Finally, the ontogenesis of
fundamental emotion is primarily a function of maturational processes.
Izard (1977) differentiates emotion from reflex. Emotion involves a
motivational state in addition to the motor action. Moreover, while
reflexes are fixed and do not have any social value, the expression of
emotion is modifiable and communicates social information.
But communication of the expressor states is not the only mediating
function of the emotional system. Emotion also provides a basis for
certain inferences about the environment and fosters social interaction
that can facilitate the development of interpersonal relations (Izard,
1984). At the individual level, an emotion provides motivation, action
tendency, and behavior lal alternatives that enhance personal adaptation
(Izard, 1984). By providing direction, focus, and integration to the
processes of sensation, perception, and cognition, emotion is the
23
principal organizer of the development of consciousness (Izard, 1978a,
Izard and Buechler, 1980).
In sum, emotions are adaptive mechanisms selected for during our
evolutionary history. They serve several functions at different levels:
individual regulation, i nter i nd i v i dua I relations, and Individual-
environment relations. Emotions are complex phenomena involving
neurophysiological
,
expressive, and phenomeno log i ca I components.
Fundamental emot ions are genet leal ly pre-wired and have character I st i
c
facial expressions and subjective qualities.
Differential emotion model
Izard's model of emotion follows essentially a neurological
sequence: the emotion phenomenon is constituted by a succession of motor
and neurological events that end in the subjective experience of emotion.
The el icitor event
. Izard (1977) mentions two broad classes of
events that elicit emotion: perception by the individual of some
characteristics of the environment, and i ntra- i nd i v i dua I processes such
as imaging, memory activity, imaginative and anticipatory thinking,
proprioceptive impulses from motor activity, and autonomic nervous system
activity. Certain cues are innate releasers of emotion (Izard, 1977): We
inherit from our evolutionary history a set of relations between releaser
events and emotions. Each emotion is prepared to respond to a limited
set of incentive events, without requiring any form of learning or
conditioning (Izard, 1984).
The neura I act i vat ion . The el icitor, processed by the appropriate
sensory receptors, changes the gradient of neural stimulation and the
24
pattern of activity in the limbic and sensory cortex ( I zard
, 1977)
.
Izard refers here to Tomkins's (1962) neural activation theory. Tomkins
(1962) defines neural activation as the product of intensity times the
number of neural firings per unit of time. in Tomkins's theory, each
emotion is triggered by a specific pattern of neural activation change
over time. Izard (1977) subscribes to Tomkins' model, but adds to it
some innate neural mechanisms programed to be selectively sensitive to
certain inputs.
Emotion differentiation. At this stage, a first differentiation of
emotion occurs. Changes in neural activation are transmitted to the
hypothalamus. From the different patterns of neura I act i vat ion
, the
hypothalamus determines the appropriate emotion and its associated facial
expression and physiological pattern.
Expression of emotion. From the hypothalamus, the impulses go the
motor cortex which organizes the neural message for facial expression.
This information is transmitted to the muscles of the face via the facial




The trigeminal (Vth cranial) nerve conducts the
proprioceptive feedback from the muscles of the face to the sensory
cortex. The integration of the facial feedback by the cortex generates
the subjective experience of emotion. This experience is the direct
derivative of neurochemical sensory processes, which does not require any
cognitive representation or transformation (Izard, 1984).
According to Izard (1977), the function of the autonomic nervous
system is secondary. The card io-vascu I ar
,
hormonal, and respiratory
systems have some importance in amplifying and sustaining emotion (Izard,
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1977). They also mobilize energy for the behavioral outcome of emotion
(Izard, 1978a). But given its poor differentiation, and the presence of
visceral activity without emotion, the autonomic nervous system cannot
possibly play a determining role in the emotion process.
The status of facial expression in emotion
In Izard's model, facial expression is a necessary component of
natural ly occurring emotion (Izard, 1978b). Nevertheless, during the
emotion process, all three components are interactive and interdependent.
No single component alone constitutes emotion (Izard, 1977). As a
heritage of our evolutionary past, facial expressions of fundamental
emotions are innate and universal (Izard, 1978a). The neural substrate
of facial patterns and their links to certain releasers and specific
subjective states is genetically programed. The neural mechanism for the
perception of facial expression Is also Innate (Izard, 1978a). Facial
expressions and more generally, the expressive behavior components of
emotion, are direct function of sensory processes that do not require, in
the stricte sense, any cognitive mediation. However, information
processing, in a more general sense, is of course involved at some level
in this process (Izard, 1984). Based on the innateness and universality
of facial expression, then, Izard (1984) postulates the universality of
the mental representation and feeling component of emotion.
Facial expression serves three main functions. First the facial
feedback provides the brain with data for the cortical integration that
generates subjective experience of emotion. Thus, facial expression
plays a determining role in the elaboration of the phenomeno I og i ca
I
26
component of emotion (Izard, 1978a). Second, facial patterns communicate
the state of the expressor and, under certain circumstances, the face can
act as an innate stimulus releaser for the perceiver. This social
signaling function Is particulary important in the development of the
infant-caregiver attachment (Izard, 1977). Third, being partly under
voluntary control, the face acts as a stage for the emot ion-cogn i t ion
Interaction. Emotion can be cognitively regulated via the voluntary
control of facial expression (Izard, 1984).
The ontogenesis of facial expression of emotion
Blol °g lcal foundat Ions
.
In his ontogenet i c mode I
, Izard (1979)
postulates a set of ten discrete emotions that are inherited from our
phylogenetic history. Izard (1979a) is hereby clearly rejecting the
different iat ion hypothesis (Sroufe, 1976), according to which all the
separate emotions have progressively stemmed from a unique and
undifferentiated state of arousal during the course of development.
The organism is prepared to respond by emotion and associated facial
expressions to a limited set of innate releaser events without any
conditioning (Izard, 1984). Through evolution, we have inherited innate
neural programs that generate the facial patterns of fundamental
emotions. The coherence between subjective state and facial expression
is also genetically programed. Although innate, fundamental emotions and
their associated expressive patterns, are not all present at birth.
Their emergence is determined by a preprogrammed biological clock.
Specific emotions appear when they become adaptive in the infant's
life. Adapt iveness must not be intended for the infant as an individual,
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but for the infant-in-social-surround. Adaptation of the individual
considered in Isoiation Is here secondary to the adaptation of the
individual in his or her
. nterper sona
. dimension. indeed, because of
their compelling and motivating strength for the perceiver, Infant facial
expressions play a determinant role In the I nf ant-careg I ver interaction.
Given Its strong genetic determinism, the ontogenesis of facial
expression is primarily a function of maturational processes and
secondarily a function of learning and experience (Izard, 1978b).
According to Izard (1984). the biological development for the basic
expressions already occurs before birth. Several distinctive facial
patterns are present In the neonate: distress, smile, disgust, and
interest (Izard. 1978b). By the firsthalfofthesecondyear.au
facial expressions of fundamental emotions have appeared. Their time of
emergence is the function, on one hand, of the neural and motoric
maturation, and on the other hand, of the maturation of the cognitive
functions that subserve the motivational component of these emotions
(Izard, 1984).
Izard (1978a) refers here to the concept of critical period. The
critical period can be considered as a milestone in the Infant
development where different personality subsystems come to Interact
together and set the stage for a particular type of learning and
development. For example, the emergence of shame/shyness marks the
beginning of the Infant discrimination between self and others. Also, at
a critical period, a given stimulus can elicit a different emotion than
the one elicited during the previous stage. For example, the face of a
stranger will elicit Interest up to six month but fear later. These
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developmental changes primarily result from the unfolding of innate
neural programs of biological maturation.
In sum, an infant comes to the world with e I aborated genet i
c
programs. These programs organize the i nnate sens i t i v I ty to certa in
releasers, the morphology of facial expression, and a timetable for the
emergence of the different facial expressions. The infant is prepared to
display a range of pure discrete expressions prior to conditioning. The
purity of the young infant facial expression is itself adaptive: it
provides very compelling signals to the caregiver. These facial patterns
undergo changes as a consequence of biological maturation, changes which
mainly affect which expression will be elicited by which releaser. As a
general developmental trend, emotion will be elicited first by
physiological stimuli (e.g. neonatal smile during REM sleep period) and
later, by progressively more psychological stimuli (e.g. the social
smi le) (Malatesta, 1985)
.
Social Izat ion. On the other hand, innate maturational programs are
not the only factors of developmental change in facial expression of
emotion. Soon after birth, a series of social processes start to
transform facial expression.
Instrumental learning. One of the first socialization factors is
the shaping of facial expression occurring during the i nf ant-careg i ver
interactions (Hyson & Izard, 1985). Indeed, the caregiver can respond or
not to child's facial expression. In general, expressions of positive
emotion will be reinforced, while expressions of negative emotions will
not, or will be punished —a process which is especially true for female
infants (Malatesta & Izard, 1985). Caregivers also adopt slow-paced
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facial displays so that infants can imitate their modeled expression
(Malatesta, 1985). These d i f f erent forms of cond I t Ion i ng and shap I ng
decrease the lability and the range of the Infant facial display. At 18
months, blended emotion expressions appear, partly as a f unct ion of
adult's shaping, and partly as a function of the increasing capacity for
memory and cognitive appraisal (Hyson & Izard, 1985).
Voluntary control of facial expression and integration of emotion.
After six months, infants learn voluntary facial expressions through
imitation and imaginative play (Izard, 1978a). In so doing they acquire
their first technique of self-regulation. At the same time, the
emotional experience becomes increasingly organized, as a consequence of
the development of the perceptive and cognitive processes associated with
a given emotion experience (Izard, 1978a). The I ntegrat ion of the
emotional experience culminates with language development which permits
thoughts and feelings to coexist simultaneously in consciousness (Izard,
1984)
.
Encul turat ion. Through all the above mentioned processes, the
infant starts to learn display and feeling rules (Izard, 1977) which
specify where and when it is appropriate to display or to feel which
facial expression. The cultural shaping of facial expression may be
tantamount to the cultural shaping of emotion experience.
Cone I us ions
As well as Buck, Izard analyzes the development of facial expression
of emotion from a strictly biological perspective. A large part of the
emotion system, including expression, subjective experience, and
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Physiological responses have been selected during the process of
evolution and are genet. caily programed. Izard defends Tomklns's
position that facial expression, initiated by innate releasers,
originates a direct experience of emotion.
The ontogenesis and morphology of facial expression of fundamental
emotion are largely a function of innate biological maturation. Facial
expressions appear full-blown soon after birth and their external
appearance undergoes very few changes. From early reflex-like
prototypes, facial expressions are progressively Integrated into more
complex forms of adaptive behaviors.
The already complex biological basis of the emotion subsystem is
elaborated upon by (a) Instrumental learning through shaping and
imitation, (b) acquisition of voluntary control and self-regulation of
facial expression, and (c) cognitive integration of emotional experience.
These processes are responsible for encu I turat ion via the learning of
display. However, the socialization action is always secondary to and
dependent on some biological given.
Ekman: a neuro-cu I tura I model
Ekman's contribution to the study of facial expression is in many
ways similar to Izard's. Both authors refer to Tomkins as the
inspiration for their work, and they both give a predominant role to
facial expression in emotional processes. That the existence of
universal facial expressions has been established owes a great deal to
both authors. However, while Izard's main concern is to elaborate a
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general theory of emotion, the work of Ekman focuses more on facial
expression of emotion in itself. Also, Ekman does not share Izard's
strong stand in favor the innateness of most emotional processes.
What I s emot ion?
Ekman (1977, 1984) studies emotion in a comprehensive model
integrating biological and cultural determinisms. in this model,
similarily to Buck's and Izard's models, emotion is defined by a
distinctive pattern of changes in three inter-related and emotion-
different I ated systems: the cognitive system, the facial-expressive
system, and the autonomic nervous system. Again, no single
characteristic is sufficient to establish emotion, but a set of
characteristics, organized into a coherent pattern, Is required. To give
an account of the relation between systems, Ekman (1984) postulates a
direct central connection between the neural pathways leading from the
motor cortex, which directs facial muscle activity, to hypothalamic areas
Involved in directing the autonomic nervous system.
Within this framework, Ekman (1984) uses the concept of emotion in a
very specific and restricted sense. Indeed, with a set of ten
differentiating characteristics, he distinguishes emotion from reflex,
mood, emotional trait, and emotional disorder.
One of the main differentiating characteristic is duration. While
reflexes are very short, the duration of emotion Is longer, although
strictly limited to between .5 and 4 seconds. Moods, possibly the
consequences of longer enduring autonomic changes, refer to longer time
spans than emotion. The concept of emotional trait defines the situation
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where a particular emotion or set of emotions chron i ca I i y reappears
.
Lastly, emotional disorder occurs when overwhe Im i ng emot ions i nterfer
with fundamental life tasks and when the individuai cannot modulate his
or her emotional experience or expression.
Emotions are also characterized by pan-cultural commonal it ies in
their distinctive faclai expressions, eliciting stimuli, and patterns of
change in the autonomic and central nervous system. Moreover, as opposed
to a reflex, emotional expression can be totally inhibited or simulated.
Emotion can also be graded in intensity, reflecting variations in the
strength of felt experience.
With this very restrictive definition of emotion, Ekman and Friesen
(1986) identify seven distinct "fundamental" emotions: happiness,
surprise, fear, disgust, sadness, anger, and contempt. In response to
mixed eliciting situations, these emotions can be blended.
The status of facial expression in emotion
Ekman's (1984) theoretical and experimental work particularly
emphasizes the facial expression of emotion. However, he notes that
expression is not the most important feature in characterizing any
affective phenomenon. Cognitive and physiological activities, as well as
social context and subjective experience are also important.
Nevertheless, Ekman describes facial expression as most readily
accessible for study. A distinctive pattern of facial expression is a
necessary condition for emotion: There is no emotion without facial
expression. Ekman recognizes that expression can be inhibited, but he
insists that the efferent impulses for a patterned facial expression will
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always be produced when an emotion Is called for. One should note that
this apparently extreme statement on the necessity of facial expression
for emotion ref.ectsmore a narrow def i n i t ion of emot ion rather than a
strong theoretical stand on the facial feedback hypothesis. indeed,
Ekman labels as "non-emotion" any affective states exceeding 4 seconds of
duration and/or lacking specific pan-human facial pattern. in contrast,
other authors still name the same states "emotion" (e.g., the study of
gr ief by Aver III, 1968)
.
The neurocul tural model of facial expression
Ekman (1973, 1977; Oster & Ekman, 1978) has developed a
comprehensive neurocu I tura
I model for studying the facial expression of
emotion. The model delineates five different components and suggests how
biology, experience, and socialization m
I
ght d I f ferent i a I I y influence
each aspect of the facial expressive system.
1
.
Emot Ion El icitors
. Based on cross-cultural studies of Boucher
and Brandt (1981) establishing commonalities in emot ion antecedents
across many cultures, Ekman proposes "universal, abstract, prototyp ic
situations as the el Icitors for each emotion" (Ekman, 1984, p. 338)
(e.g., an unexpected event for surprise). Experience and socialization
simply fill in the details, elaborating the universal prototyplc
el icitors for each emotion.
2. Appraisal Mechanisms analyze and evaluate the internal and
external environment for potential el icitors of emotional responses.
These mechanisms can be rapid and automatic if the eliciting situation
matches with one of the prototypes. These automatic processes can be
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determined genetically or through repeated experiences. But if the
antecedent event is not clearly related to a prototype situation, an
extended appraisal, involving more ponderous and protracted cogn I t i ve
processing, and thus more time Is required.
In any case, these appraisal mechanisms determine which emotion to
activate. This is done by engaging the corresponding affect program and
by triggering memories, images, and cognitions associated with the chosen
emot ion
.
h—The Central Affect Program is a preprogrammed neurological
sequence that sets off changes in a number of emotional responses,
Including the subjective experience of emotion. This set of responses
constitutes the emotional response system. The central ity of the affect
program allows it to control and coordinate simultaneous activities in
several response systems.
1: The Emotional Response System includes facial and vocal
responses, verbal responses, skeletal motor responses (e.g., turning
away), more fully elaborated coping behaviors (e.g., fighting), and
autonomic and central nervous system changes. The emotional response
system also comprises the subjective experience of emotion. This latter
component Includes the memories, images, labels, and expectations related
to the specific emotion, as well as the awarness of all or some of the
above mentioned changes.
5. The Display Rules are processes for managing or interfering with
the emotional responses. A display rule specifies who can show what
emotion to whom, when, where, and how. Each individual has a defined set
of display rules learned through his/her Idiosyncratic experience of
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socialization within family and culture. The display rules can amplify,
modulate, or feign an emotional response. They can also mask an
emotional response by the appearance of another one.
The ontogenesis of facial expression of emotion
In a general way, Ekman (Oster & Ekman, 1978) suggests that facial
expression of emotion evolves ontogenet
i ca I I y i n a gradua I trans i t ion
from automatic and uncontrolled expressions of emotion to more modulated,
subtle, and voluntary expressions of emotion. The well-defined
neurocultural model has, in this respect, precise developmental
impl Icat ions.
The model states that the display rules and most of the eliciting
properties of the situations are learned. Indeed, as developed above,
the display rules are the results of soc i a I I zat ion and most of the
eliciting properties of the stimuli are learned by the appraisal
mechanisms. Through experience, conditioning, and cognitive maturation,
the appraisor develops more complex and differentiated representations of
the primary prototypes.
The other components of the model are described either as
"universal" or as "Innate". This distintion between "universal" and
"Innate" is important. Indeed, Oster & Ekman (1978) Insist on the fact
that universality does not imply In any way innateness. They suggest a
number of alternative paths by which particular muscles' actions leading
to facial expressions could come to be associated with particular
emotions In people of all cultures. These paths range from being innate
to being acquired through learning that is universal within the species.
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Thus, according to Ekman and Oster, and contrary to th. recant
interpretation of Zlvln (1986a). the affect program responsible for the
constancies In the facia, appearances of emo, I on does no. need to be
fixed at birth.
After making the distinction between universaiity and innateness,
the neurocu.tural model states that the neurological paths under lying
Physiological, facial, and muscular features of emotion are Innate. The
affect program, and the prototypical core of the eliciting situations are
reported as universal. More precisely, Ekman and Oster (1982)
established In a review of the literature that the facial musculature is
fully formed and functional at birth. Oster (Oster & Ekman, 1978) also
demonstrated that the full potential for facial expression was present at
birth. Indeed, pre-term as we I I as full-term infants perform all the
action units displayed by adults, and combine them in a non-random way.
Ekman and Oster (1982) also reviewed evidence that d i st i net i ve f ac I a I
expressions ressembling certain adults' expressions are present In early
i nf ancy
.
Cone I us ions
In his neurological model Ekman articultes biological and
psychological systems of analysis. The laws of evolution are responsible
for the neurological and motor substrata of facial expression and culture
transmits the display rules used during social Interaction. While this
model allows some place for individual learning, it does not develop an
analysis of facial expression at the psychological level. Ekman's
biological analysis of the development of facial expression is directly
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drawn from Tomkins's model and is very si.l lar to Buck's and Izard's
analysis. However
.
Ekman must be credited for the concept of display
rules which links social and biological perspectives.
Thus, from a developmental point of view, this model postulates that
the neurological substrate for the expressions of fundamental emotion are
innate and appear in a very discrete sequence very early in life. Later,
children learn to control their facial expressions to conform to social
display rules.
The strength of this model is twofold: i t c I ear I y de I i neates f i ve
components In the production of facial expressions and it specifies to
which extent each component is i nnate
, un i versa I
, or acqu i red . This
latter distinction, also to be credited to Ekman, offers an interesting
alternative to the classic dichotomy between nature and nurture. It
grants to learning a significant role in the determination of facial
expression and, more specifically, it suggests the possibility of pan-
human learning. Unfortunately, this possibility has not been explored by
Ekman
.
However, the neuro-cu I tura I model is not primarily a developmental
model. Its first function is to give account of facial expression in
adults. Nevertheless, the model does have some interesting implications
for the ontogenesis of facial expression, but this is a secondary concern
for Ekman. For example, how display rules and their usage are learned is
not specified.
Finally, Ekman uses the concept of emotion in a very restrictive
sense. The neuro-cu I tura I model only applies to the specific responses
that fall under this narrow definition of emotion.
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Emde: a psychoanalytic mode I
The experimental work of Emde, a student of Spitz, is rooted in a
psychoanalytic framework and in Emde's own clinical practice. He
especially addresses the development of affect in early infancy.
Although Emde Is developing a model of affect and has extensively studied
facial expression, he has never proposed a mode I of the production of
emotional facial expression. Thus, his contribution must be considered
In a slightly different manner from that used for the other authors
discussed In this chapter.
What Is emot ion?
Emde (1980a) grounds his theory of emotion in Freud's later
conception of affect (Freud, 1916-1917; 1926), which Emde refers to as
the "organizational model". This model regards affect as a highly
composite structure Including, In the first place, motor innervation and
discharges, and secondly certain feelings. These fee I ings are the
perceptions of the motor actions just mentioned, and the direct feelings
of pleasure/displeasure. The core which holds this composite structure
of affect together is rooted in the biological history of the species.
As a composite state, affect can be conscious or unconscious, and it
includes cognitive elements. Affect is an active agent (what Emde calls
a "principle") located In the ego; It organizes mental activity,
behavior, and symptoms. As such, affect is considered as a signal rather
than as a discharge phenomenon.
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Drawing from contemporary developments In psychoanalytic thought,
Emde (1980a) elaborates on the Freudian organizational model. He
stresses the adaptive and organizational values of affect (Emde, 1980a,
1984). He also notes that human social relatedness is impossible without
affective participation. Affect, because of its communicative value for
the caregiver, Is partlculary necessary for survival during infancy.
Affects are continuous aspects of our life, present both in conflict and
no-confllct spheres of the ego. Finally, Emde (1980a) also incorporates
Ekman's and Izard's concept of fundamental discrete emotion.
Facial expression of emotion
Facial expression is an Important part of the "motor innervations
and discharges" that are a primary constituent of affect. Emde avoids
the definition problems of emotion by study i ng fac i a I express ion of
emotion as a response system In Its own right, without specifying the
nature of its links with the internal states that generate facial
expression (Emde, Kligman, Reich, & Wade, 1978).
Emde (Emde et al., 1978) stresses two fundamental characteristics of
emotion expressions. Both of these character I stcs can be discerned In
the way emotion expressions are communicated.
- a. Three dimensions, hedonlc tone, activation, and Internal ity-
externality, can be extracted from emotional experience. These
dimensions reflect biologically meaningful messages, playing an important
ro le in adaptat ion.
- b. A number of categories of emotion, each of which carries discrete
information, can be Identified in emotion expression. These categories
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are unW.r.,1. As such. ,hey ,00 cons, Itttt. biologic,.* mean,ng,u,
messages. They are biologically organized, aUhough ,hey are no, presen,
a, birth and appear according ,0 anep.gene,,c sequence. They can be
combined to form "blends".
These two characteristics are related to two different neurological
structures In the brain (Emde, 1984). The neurological substrate of the
dimension Is located in the diencephalic and reticular core of the brain.
The discrete emotion requires more complex feedback from the
hypothalamus, the thalamus, the autonomous nervous system, and the
forebraln (Emde, Gaensbauer
, & Harman, 1976).
The ontogenesis of facial expression
The genetic field theory. Emde's theoretical framework restates the
genetic field theory of Spitz (Spitz, 1959; Emde et al.. 1976), and
Emde's research Is organized within this context. App I i ed to f ac I a I
expression (Emde et al. 1978), the theory asserts that:
1. There are uneven rates of physiological and behavioral
development In Infancy. Times of rapid changes are marked by the
subsequent emergence of a new level of organization and of new functions
In the Infant behavior. As In Freud's theory of psychosexual
development, the development of facial expression of emotion proceeds by
a series of qualitative changes. The ontogenesis of facial expression Is
thus discontinuous.
2. Affective behaviors, particularly facial expression, are
prominent Indicators of these periods of rapid changes.
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3. The proper, ion. I Infiuence
.actor on the development of af.ee.
egression
.hi... from maturation to experience. The (atter
progressively becomes the most determining
.actor a. the end o. the firs,
year .
Emde describes these periods of raniHOT P' d changes as developmental




9 6). He has focused specifically on
the two developmental shifts occurring during the first year, at 2 and at
7-9 months. Both are marked by the onset of new facial expressions.
These onsets themselves have precursors. indeed, some components of
emotional facial expression, not yet thoroughly organized or Integrated,
may appear as developmental antecedents. The new facial expressions
bring dramatic changes In the Infant's social life, and occur at a nexus
of organizational changes In other systems (Emde, 1980b).
The biological maturation and experiential factors In facial
expression. The changes occurring in the development of facial
expression are functions of two factors. They are determined first by
the biological adaptive forces selected during evolution, that guarantees
adaptation to an average acceptable environment. Secondarily, experience
and learning secure the Individual's adaptation to a particular biosoclal
context
.
The biological adaptation Is determined by our phylogenetic
heritage, which fixates the time of onset and the developmental pattern
of facial expression of emotion. By Its Innateness and universality,
facial expression reflects a maturatlonal self-organizing tendency. It
Is a built-in message with the adaptive function of facilitating the
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attachment bond, and of communicating with the sociai environment in
general, and with the caregiver in particular.
The main roie of exper lence and learning is to fully achieve the
differentiation of the blo.oglcally g , ven emot ion expressions. For
example, fearfu.ness and surprise emerge in an undifferentiated form and
are distinguished through later experiences (Emde et al., 1978).
Emde (1980b) minimizes the importance of the socialization and
experiential factors. For him, facial expression is not a signal due to
the consequence of socialization. Rather, it Is a signal to begin with,
already shaped to the environment through its phy logenet I c h i story
.
Facial expression is a social signal (communlcat ing something to the
environment) before being a psychological signal (communicating to the
Individual )
.
Cone I us Ions
The main perspective of Emde is biological. The structure of affect
In general and of facial expression In particular have been elaborated
during the evolutionary history and are transmitted genetically. Facial
expression fulfi I Is an adaptive function of communication in highly
social species. Some aspects of Emde's analysis refers to a
psychological system of analysis. Indeed, affect Is described as an
active ego principle and individual learning achieves the differentiation
of biologically given facial expression.
Emotion expression develops in a discontinuous way, moving through
different stages or periods of "behavioral shifts". The sequence of
their onset Is innate, fixed by our phylogenetic history. However, each
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fundamentalexpress.cn has precursors. Thus, this model combines both
differentiation and discrete onset schemes. The function of
.earning
Processes Is considered to be secondary, as they operate, the final touch
is added to the whole system's adaptation to a specific environment.
in sum, Emde offers an Interesting account of the development of
facia, expression during the first year. His approach integrates
psychoanalysis, Piaget's and Spitz's conception of development stages,
and experimental findings. As noted above, Emde's model integrates the
two prototypical schemes of facial expression development-
differentiation and discrete onset-and combines the concepts of discrete
category and dimensionality of emotion.
The core of his model however, is directly drawn from Spitz's
genetic field theory. No significant conceptual improvement has been
contributed by Emde. Other limits of the model are that (a) it does not
specify the nature of the re I at ionsh
i p between f ac i a I express ion and
emotion, (b) it does not provide a model for the production of facial
expression, (c) it is limited to development during the first year of
life, and (d) spontaneous and voluntary facial expressions are not
dist Inguished.
Sroufe: a differentiation model
Sroufe (1979) proposes a general theory of affect development In
infancy inspired by the work of Spitz (1959). His model focuses mainly
on the interplay and inseparability of emotional and cognitive processes.
As Emde, Sroufe offers no explicit definition of emotion nor does he list
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components of emotion HowAvsr a ,e e , a general conception of emotion can be
extracted from his work.
What i s emot ion?
Although autonomic arousal and expressive behavior are part of the
emotional process, they do not constitute emotion perse. Emotion
implies cognitive processes that allow (a) an engagement in the
environment which resuits in a psychophysiological tension different from
norma, arousal and (b) a subjective experience through awareness,
recognition, and self-concept. From this perspective, then, one cannot
speak of "true" emotion prior to the acquisition of the differentiation
between self and surrounding. in sum, emotion is primarily the result of
the appraisal of certain characteristics of a given situation.
The status of facial expression in infant emotion
According to Sroufe (1979), there is no isomorphic relationship
between facial expression and emotional experience. Facial expression
cannot be used as a criterion for determining emotion in infant. Indeed,
affective states may be communicated by facial expressions which differ
in infants and in adults. Thus, the absence in infants of a typical
adult facial expression, does not allow one to conclude the absence of
the corresponding emotional experience.
In Sroufe's (1979) model, facial expression serves two functions.
First, facial expression communicates needs, feelings, and internal
states to the social environment. Second, infants use facial expression
to modulate indirectly their state of arousal. Indeed, via appropriate
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facial expression, the infant can encourage or discourage caregivers'
behaviors which affect the infant's state of arousal.
The ontogenesis of facial expression
In Sroufe's work, the study of facial expression is only secondary
to the study of emotional development. Thus, in order to introduce the
development of facial expression, a short summary of Sroufe's (1979)
theory of emotional development will be presented.
Emotional development. Sroufe (1979) considers the development of
emotion from the perspect I ve of ontogenesis in general. He emphasizes
the interrelations and Interdependencies between cognitive and emotional
development. The general organization of Infant development structures
emot i ona I deve I opment
.
Emotion evolves from a global and undifferentiated distress/non
distress continuum to progressively distinct and specific emotions. This
general developmental trend is characterized by both continuity and
discontinuity. The continuity Is marked by the fact that no emotion
suddenly appears full-blown. Each emotion has precursors that emerge
progressively and can be traced back to the original dlstress/non
distress continuum. For example, Sroufe asserts that fear and anger have
a common precursor, wariness, which is a psychological arrest in response
to a mixture of familiar and unfamiliar elements.
However, this progressive emergence is also structured by a fixed
succession of stages. At each stage, a reorganization of the previous
structure and qualitative changes occur. Each stage leads to
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discontinuities in the rate of emotionai development. As for Emde (Emde
et al., 1976), Sroufe's (1979) concept of stage is directiy derived from
thePiagetian concept of cogn i t i ve stage
. in th is respect
, both authors
defend very similar views.
Cognitive and emotional developmental reorganizations or stages
parallel each other. For example, fear and anger emerge simultaneously
with object permanence and the understanding of the concept of
intentional ity and causality (Sroufe, 1979). At each stage, new behavior
patterns and qualitative changes in emotion and facial expression appear.
Sroufe (1979) lists a fixed sequence of eight stages which unfold
during the first 2 years of life (table 1). The emergence of a new stage
Is linked to the maturation of the central nervous system and to social
and cognitive development.
Facial ex pression development
. Facial expression deve lops para I le
I
to emotion, in a progressive differentiation through the same eight
stages or periods of reorganization. Each stage is marked by the
fixation of one or several new facial patterns. For each given facial
expression, specific precursors can be identified. Thus primitive pre-
emotional states may contain facial movements that appear later as
emotion differentiates.
For example, the social smile and the stranger fear reaction are
qualitatively different from earlier expressions of positive or negative
affect (e.g., endogenous smile for positive affect and wariness for
negative affect). Yet, these differentiated emotions have their roots in
TABLE 1
Stages of Affective Development
Stages and Affect Development
Absolute Stimulus Barrier
.
Invulnerability to external stimuli
Turning toward the Environment
.
Relative vulnerability (openess to stimuli)
.
Attention and motor activity coordination
(precursors of interest and curiosity)
. Smi I ing, cooing
Pos I t I ve Affect
.
Re I iable social smi le
(reciprocal exchange with caregiver)
.
Capacity for anticipation, thus for frustration
(rage and war iness)
.
Laugh: pleasure becomes an exitatory phenomenon
Act i ve Part I c i pat ion
.
Effort to elicit social response
. Awarness of own emotions
. Joy, fear, anger, surprise
At tachment
. Fear of stranger
. Integration of emotional reactions
. Differentiation of emotional expression
Pract I c i ng Stage
. Exploration, self-assertion




Stages of Affective Development
A9e Stages and Affect Development
12-24 m. Formation of Self-Concept






let of wills, def lance
24 m. and Ident if icat ion
older
Further differentiation of the emotional system
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these earner expressions and they are a,so logically related to later
affect expressions (e.g., happiness) as the emotionality continues to
evo I ve
However, as deveioped above, facial expression does not have an
isomorphic reiation to emotional experience. in the course of
development, facial expression may appear before or after the emergence
of the experience it expresses. In the latter case, facial expression
lags behind the capacity for experience but it further amplifies and
sharpens the experience.
Cone I us ions
Sroufe analyzes facial expression from a psychological perspective.
Through cognitive maturation, learning, and experience, facial expression
differentiates progressively from a distress/non distress state.
Moreover, the functions of facial express ion—commun I cat ion and
regulation of affect—are purely psychological.
Sroufe clearly proposes a differentiation scheme with a series of
reorganization stages. He maintains that there is no isomorphic
relationship between facial expression and emotional state, but he does
not specify what the nature of an alternative relationship of facial
expression and emotion could be. Similarily, the concept of emotion is
left undefined. Finally, Sroufe does not consider the possibility of
universal facial expression, nor does he distinguish between spontaneous
and voluntary facial expression.
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Lewis: a socialization model
Lewis's interests are centered on emotions, deve.op.en. and
socialization of affect. He presents a detailed .ode! of emotion and of
emotional development, and discusses within this context the ontogenesis
of facial expression.
Emotion: working definition and model
According to Lewis, emotion is comprised of a complex set of
behaviors occurring around an equally elaborate set of situations or
stimulus events (Lewis & Michalson, 1983). Because of this complex ity,
instead of trying to define emotion, Lewis prefers to represent it in
terms of a structural analysis.
I n th i s ana I ys I s , the components of
emotion are specified, rather than explained (Lewis & Michalson, 1983).
Five major components, together, constitute emotion. They are
labeled elicitor, receptor, state, expression, and experience (Lewis &
Michalson, 1983, 1985; Lewis & Saarni, 1985).
The emot ional el icitors refer to situations or stimulus events that
trigger the emotional receptors. The el icitors can be internal (e.g., a
thought) or external (e.g., a loud noise), and their capacity to elicit
emotion can be learned or innate.
Th e emotional receptors are specific loci or pathways in the central
nervous system that mediate changes in the physiological and cognitive
state of the organism. The type of event to which receptors are
sensitive as well as the development of their function in the emotional
system can be either acquired through experience or genetically encoded.
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The emotional states are made of particular
changes in the somatic and neuronal activity. These states are the
consequence of the activation of the emotional receptors. The notion of
channels important. Unlike moods, emotional states are Uans^nt
patterned alteration in ongoing levels of physiological activity.
The emotional expressions are observable facial, vocal, postural,
and locomotor behaviors accompanying emotional states.
The emotional experiences are the individual's conscious or
unconscious perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations of their
emotional states and expressions. These exper iences are the result of
cognitive processes Influenced by a range of prior socialization
exper I ences
.
Lewis argues that most of the connections between emotion components
are the product of learning and socialization. However, certain
connections might be innate. For example, certain receptors have a
genetically programed sensitivity to some elicitors as for a stimulus
releaser (Lewis & Mlchalson, 1985). The connections between components
are not as unidirectional as they seem to be. The emotion phenomenon
does not unfold linearly from elicitor to emotional experience, but,
instead, feedback is exchanged among all components and information flows
multidirectional ly. For example, the emotional state can influence the
activity of the receptors.
Lewis distinguishes between primary and secondary emotions (Lewis &
Michalson, 1983). Primary emotions are the ones that ontogenet i ca I I
y
appear first. Secondary emotions are constituted by the mixture of
several primary emotions.
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The status of facial expression in emotion
The emotional expression component includes facial expression which
is a function of two main factors. First, it is determined by complex
neuromuscular responses. These responses are unlearned, biological ly
programmed, and universal. The second factor, which receives much
emphasis from Lewis, is the social ruies resulting from the soc i a i i zat ion
process
.
Lewis denies the existence of an isomorphic relation between
expression, states, and experience (Lewis & M I cha I son
, 1985) . Even i
f
biological forces may have linked facial expression and emotional state
at an early point of the ontogenesis, these components are normally
dissociated, and their interactions are controlled by rules resulting
from the socialization process. Lewis argues that the universal aspects
of facial expression reported by Ekman and Izard may simply be the result
of inter-culture simi lar it ies (Lewis & Mlchalson, 1983). Thus, if within
the expression component itself, Lewis acknowledges the existence of
genet ica I ly encoded facial configurations, he denies the existence of
innate one-to-one connections between these facial configurations and
some subjective experiences or some physiological states (Lewis &
Michalson, 1985).
In Lewis's model, facial expression serves several functions, one of
which Is to communicate emotional state changes. This information has
itself two social purposes. First, the communication of emotional states
elicits empathic behaviors by inducing in another the particular emotion
that one is feeling (contagion). Second, facial expression tells others
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what the person Is feeling, and allows ,hem ,o adjust, to faCMta.e. or
to inhibit the em0 .lon. Indeed, In most circumstances, emotion
expression can he totally Inhibited or I, can be produced In absence of
emotional state In order to Influence those to whom the expression Is
addressed (in instance of deception).
Facial expression can also help to determine emotional experience,
but, contrary to Izard's position, only via cognitive evaluation. By
feedback, facial expression I nf I uences emot I ona I state. Finally, facial
expression can act as an Internal ellcltorand




The ontogenesis of facial expression of emotion
Lewis divides the Issue of emotional development into two questions.
The first one concerns the formation of the different emotional
components, the second, the estab I i shement of the var ious connect ions
among components (Lewis & Mlchalson, 1983). The development of both
components and connections Is determined by three factors: socialization,
biological maturation, and cognitive development. In Lewis' perspective,
the study of facial expression development becomes the study of how
socialization, biological processes, and cognitive maturation interact to
produce facial expression, and to connect facial expression toother
emotional components.
The first point, how facial expressions, per se, emerge, has not
been developed by Lewis. He recognizes the Importance of biological and
maturational processes In the onset of particular facial configurations
(Lewis & Mlchalson, 1985). The emergence of different facial expressions
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as a function of age seems to Imply a systematic unfolding of emotion In
emotion development. Lewis does not take position in the debate between
the progressive differentiation hypothesis and the discrete onset
hypothesis.
Lewis has mainly studied the second question: the development of the
links between facial expressions and other components. Facial expression
is principally connected to states and elicitors, with the likelihood of
observing an emotional expression depending on the nature of these
connect ions
.
The development of the state-expression connection
. Lewis proposes
a curvilinear relation between facial expression maturation and emotional
state (Lewis & Michalson, 1985). The development of this relation can be
summarized in three stages, as shown by figure 3.
Stage 1 is a biological asynchronous state which characterized by
the relative und i f ferent
I
at ion of the internal states and by their
absence of relation with facial expression. At this stage, infants do
not display consistent patterns of facial expression, or, if they do, it
is in the absence of a differentiated emotional state. To illustrate
this stage, Lewis gives the example of the endogenous REM smile which is
not el icited by a part icular state or el i c i tor (Lewis & Michalson, 1983)
.
Stage 2 is marked by a greater synchrony: different patterns of
facial expressions now correspond to different emotional states. Lewis
proposes two hypothesis to explain that synchrony. In the first
hypothesis, the link between facial expression and emotional state has
been established by biological factors. The socialization processes are
not powerful enough and/or the cognitive processes are not developed
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FIGURE 3
The Relationship between Expression and Emotional state





to disengage the facia, expression from the emotional state,
-n the second hypothes.s, this
, ink ,3 the consequence of
Practices which resu.t in the se.ective d.sp.ay by the
particuiar facia, express.ons. Thus, for example, when careg. vers
reinforce a facia, expression, they are a. so likely to be infiuencing the
connection between that expression and the discriminate interna, states
that develop from an original undifferentiated form (Lewis & M.chalson,
1985)
.
At stage 3, the maturation of the cognitive structures allows social
reinforcement and socialization rules to be operative and facial
expression and emotional state are once again independent. However, the
degree of asynchrony may vary for different emotions. This variation Is
a function of five factors: (1) the nature of the emotion itself, (2) Its
degree of socialization, (3) the extent to which the emotion can be
controlled, (4) Its particular ellcitor, and (5) the Intensity of the
e I Ic I tor
.
As shown In figure 3, the development of each emotion has its own
timetable, determined by both biological and social factors. This
results in a unique temporal sequence in terms of (a) the first
appearance of a particular facial expression and (b) its correspondence
with a specific internal state. The time period between stages may also
vary for different emotions (Lewis & Mlchalson, 1985).
Unfortunately, Lewis does not elaborate a model of the development
of the connection between elicltor and expression. He Just mentions that
some ellcitors are automatic and biologically given, although they may be
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inhibited in the course of development, other elicitorsare learned by
association (Lewis & Michalson, 1983).
How is facial expression social Ized?
. The same mechanisms prevail
for facial expression as for other sets of behaviors. They can be
classified in three categories (Lewis & Saarnl, 1985).
Direct effects are the one where one or more agents of socialization
act on the child. It can take the form of instrumental learning,
classical conditioning, and diadlc teaching.
In indirect effects, the child is socialized through the observation
of other's behavior. This can be accomp I i shed by identification (the
child incorporates the values, goals, and behavior of another person),
imitation and social learning.
Biological effects or contagion occurs when the emotion expression
of another serves as an elicitor.
The socialization of emotion has five aspects, each of which Is
included in a feeling rule (Lewis & Saarni, 1985). Feeling rules
determine (1) how, and (2) when to express emotion, how emotions are (3)
managed, (4) labeled, and (5) interpreted. The two first rules,
corresponding to the display rules of Ekman (1984), are particulary
relevant for the socialization of facial expression (Lewis & Michalson,
1983, 1985). Through these rules, children learn when a display is
appropriate. They also acquire knowledge about emotion expression apart
from their actual experience.
Display rules start to operate at stage 3 of the dissociation
between facial expression and emotional states. At this stage, facial
expression becomes a symbol. It no longer has a one-to-one relation with
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the objects or actions it is supposed to represent, but rather uses some
arbitrary means to represent these objects or act ions . Th
, s separat ion
of expression from the interna, state aiiows facia, expression to
function as an arbitrary code (Lewis & Michalson, 1985).
Cone I us Ions
Although he emphazlses more the social perspective, Lewis considers
facial expression from all three levels of analysis. At the biological
level, he acknowledges some innate pre-wiring in the morphology of facial
expressions at their Initial onset. From a psychological perspective, he
stresses the importance of individual learning in the acquis! t Ion of
facial expression and the function of facial expression as a regulator of
emotion and as help in determining the emotional state. Last but not
least, at the social level, facial expression, shaped by social rules and
codes, serves as a medium to communicate emotional states.
This model presents a curvilinear relationship between age and the
correspondance of facial expression and the Internal states. It also
proposes a succession of two factors as determlnents of the ontogenesis
of facial expression. In early Infancy, biological maturation Is
responsible for the onset of consistent facial patterns and their
relationship to internal states. Very soon, however, socialization
processes Influence the production of facial expression and shadow
biological factors. Facial displays are then totally determined by
social factors. As stated above, Lewis does not take a position in the
debate between differentiation and discrete onset models.
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Unfortunately, this mode, does not detail either the nature of the
biological factors nor what processes these factors determine.
Similar My. ,t Is not explained fully how fac.a. expression can help to
determ.ne or to regu.ate the emot.ona. state. Lewis also defends a
strong voluntary control of facial expression. Yet, a wealth of
emplr.cal evidence, reviewed in the next chapter
, test I f les how th I
s
control Is difficult to achieve, even In adulthood.
General Conclusion
The Integration of the six schemes of facial expression development
presented above Is hindered by the absence of consensus about a model
detailing the encoding mechanisms of facial expression. Recently, Zlvln
(1986) tried to elaborate a general model of facial expression
communication, attempting to discuss the development of expressive
behavior within this context. As a ske leta I mode I
, she proposes an
organizing framework consisting of six components (context, appraiser,
emotional state, editor, expressive behavior, and reactor), and of 17
links among these components. In her analysis of the ontogenesis of
nonverbal expression, Zlvln reviews all the possible processes explaining
how the components of her model and their links might develop. Zlvin's
approach however, considers expressive behavior In general, not
specifically facial expression of emotion. Her model has also been
criticized for overemphasizing cognitive processes (Hlnde, 1986; Izard,
1986). This last section of the first chapter will attempt to extract a
model specific to the development of facial expression of emotion from
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Four of the six authors presented, Buck, Izard, Ekman, and Lewis,
deve.op a structured mode, for the encoding of facia, expression. Erode
and Sroufe focus more on deve lopmenta
. concerns and do not offer an
explicit account of the production mechanisms of facial expression.
A synopsis of the four structured models is presented in Table 2.
It appears that these four authors roughly agree on a general framework
and that six components can be extracted from their models: (a) an
elicitor which consists of any internal or external emotional stimulus,
(b) an appraiser which detects the elicitor and organizes the emotional
response, (c) the expressive behavior including facial expression, (d)
the autonomic responses, (e) the subject i ve experience of emotion, and
(f) an editor which conforms the expressive behavior to the display
rules. A model of facial expression development must determine how these
components appear, evolve, and interact to produce facial expression
during ontogenesis.
Most authors agree on the basic scheme of the process: An elicitor
triggers the appraiser which in turn generates facial expression after
being censored by the editor. A controversy appears however, about the
nature of the link between facial expression and other components like
subjective experience or autonomic responses. Similarly, there Is little
agreement about the determinants
—
genetic transmission or learning—of
both these components and their links.
It also seems established that, with the exception of some stimuli
functioning as ethological releasors, the elicitors are learned during
the process of development. Still, theorists referring to biological





than do the authors espousing a social perspective. simi iar ly, Buck,
Izard, Ekman, and Emde hoid the motor and neurai substrata of facial
expression to be genetically pre-wired but for Sroufe, the facia,
patterns of emotion are entirely learned. The consensus is however, that
at least the spontaneous facial displays of fundamental emotions lie in
an innate biological basis. The debate concerning the relationship
between components remains unsettled. While some authors state that the
appraiser and its links to the elicltors are basically inherited from the
Phylogenetic history (e.g., Buck, 1984), others maintain that these
components are learned during the process of development (e.g., Lewis and
Michalson, 1983). Moreover, different hypothesis have been formulated
about the Interaction between facial expression and subjective experience
or autonomic responses (e.g., facial feedback hypothesis). This topic is
still vigorously debated.
Nevertheless, most authors recognize a direct relationship between
appraiser and spontaneous facial expression. Similarly, all models
attribute an important role to facial expression for assessing the
emotional state and for determining the subjective experience of emotion.
Yet, controversy persists about the necessity and sufficiency of this
function of facial expression, and about the mechanisms involved.
Finally, the importance of the display rules which determine the
relationship of voluntary expression— learned, by definition— to the
elicitors is largely recognized. Yet, this still recent concept needs to
be further elaborated.
Concerning the general process of the developmental model itself,
the consensus for an, at least minimal, biological basis for spontaneous
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facia, expression has contributed to abandoning the orlglna! formation
of the differentiation mode!. Most authors orobose a discrete onset of
full-blown brototyolca, expressions or an onset proceeding through a
seguence of qualitatively different stages. Thus with Sroufe being the
exception, the basic model of Bridges (1932) seems to have been abandoned
by contemporary theorists.
At the more abstract level of the systems of analysis, one notices
the prevalence of the biological and social perspectives. Facial
expression has mainly been presented either as an adapt I ve behav ior
selected for by the laws of evolution during phylogeny or as functional
code of communication determined by social and cultural norms.
Unfortunately, the psychological perspective has often been ignored. For
example, while most authors agree on the importance of facial expression
In the regulation of emotion and behavior in general, the development of
this function during ontogenesis has received very little attention.
Moreover, theorists have totally ignored the ontogenesis of the
recognition of facial expression. This capacity is too easily assumed to
be learned. Empirical evidence suggests that some facial expressions may
function as potent pre-wired stimulus releasors and may have an innate
signal value (e.g., Lanzetta & McHugo, 1986). Yet, a model of the
development of facial expression recognition remains to be developed
In sum, the six theories introduced above offer more controversy
than consensus. A general scheme though, seems to underlie most models:
Some fundamental facial displays are inherited from the phylogenetlc
history and, given the appropriate stimulations and social interactions,
appear early in infancy. It is still uncertain how these facial displays
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are related to the appraiser and other components of the model during the
process of development. Soon however, spontaneous expression Is modified
through the socialization processes. These modifications are later
organized in a structured set of editing norms for the expressive
behavior: the display rules. To f I nd emp i r i ca I ev I dence support I ng th i
s
general scheme and to resolve part of the controversy, the next chapter
will review the experimental data about the development of recognition
and expression of facial displays and will confront the different
theories on empirical grounds.
CHAPTER ||
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACIAL EXPRESSION OF EMOTION
This chapter reviews the recent research on the development of
facial expression of emotion from birth, up to but not inciuding
adolescence. Parallel to a renewed interest in emotion and facial
expression, the research on the ontogenesis of the emotional dispiays has
developed dramatically in the last 10 years.
To systematize the large and diverse spectrum of experiments related
to this area, the studies presented have been classified into three
sections. The first section reviews the studies concerning the
development of the encoding or expression of facial expression. The
second section reviews the studies concerning the development of the
decoding or recognition of facial expression. Finally, the last section
reviews the studies concerning the development of display rules. While
the first two sections correspond to a classic subdivision of this area
of research (Buck, 1984), the third section reflects a more recent but
developing domain of interest.
Almost all of the studies to be presented in this chapter have been
published within the last fifteen years, since earlier research has been
reviewed by Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973). The conclusions of these
authors will be summarized and integrated with the findings of recent




The research investigating how facial expression of emotion develops
in infants and in children will „ ret be presented
. since numerous
authors have reported differences between spontaneous and voluntary
facial displays, these two forms of facial expression will be reviewed
separately (Buck, 1984; Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1979a).
Spontaneous facial expression
The review of the studies on the development of spontaneous facial
expression of emotion can be best understood in term of the ontogenic
sequence of development. Accordingly, we wi I I first consider the early
facial displays of neonates, next, we will review facial expression in
Infant and ch I Idren.
Early facial displays in neonates
It has been well established that all the muscles of the face are
anatomically and physiologically functional as early as the seventh month
of gestation (Humphrey, 1970). This suggests a potential for facial
expression even before birth. Also, most of the theories of facial
expression development hold precise and differentiated predictions about
neonatal facial expressivity. Despite the important theoretical
implications that could be drawn from careful and systematic observations
of neonatal facial expressions, very few recent studies have been
conducted on this topic.
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Approaching this question, Field anri her «mi
,
r ia d her colleagues studied the
reactions of neonates (mean age: 36 h.) to a mode, posing three emotions:
happiness, sadness, and surprise (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, &Cohen,
1982). From the videotaped facia, expressions of the neonates, Judges
could guess w.th a significant accuracy the model's facial expression.
Using a more analytic and fine-grained technique of decoding
-a
version of FACS adapted for infants- Oster and Ekman (1978) analyzed
facial expressions of 20-minutes- to three-months-old neonates. They
observed that all but one discrete facial action listed in FACS can be
cleariy identified In both full- and pre-term infants. The exception was
AU 13, which raises the lips' corners In a smirk. Ekman and Oster
,
however, noted that this facial action is very rare In adults and thus
may have been missed in the sample.
All the other facial actions were d i st I net i ve I n appearance and
could be finely discriminated. They were often displayed in combination
with other facial actions. Ekman and Oster suggest the existence of some
consistency In the occurrence of these combinations. Unfortunately, they
did not investigate this question in their data.
These two studies confirm that at least the neuromuscular
prerequisites for facial expression are present at birth. Neonates can
perform all the facial muscular actions necessary for the total range of
facial expression. Also, the data of Field and her colleagues (Field et
al., 1982) suggest that facial expression is potentially intelligible to
the infant's caregivers.
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Spontaneous facial displays in Infants
The young children's proficiency in o^« +oncienc in spontaneous facial expression
has generally been studied by p.acing infants in
situations in which their facia, behavior
,3 observed. a wealth of
situations varying In specificity andln
been used. For example, In a general study by izard and his colleagues,
untrained judges had to identify facial expressions of one- to nine-
month-old infants (Izard, Huebner
, Risser, McGinnes, and Dougherty,
1980). Slides of peak facial expressions were taken from videotapes of
infants in a variety of situations. Judges identified the facial
expressions of the eight basic emotions listed by Izard (1977): interest,
happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, and fear,
although the consensus was low for the expressions of anger, disgust, and
contempt. However, as facial displays were not related to the context,
this study offers no basis to establish a correspondence between facial
expression and emotional states.
Other studies relate facial expressions to their context. For
example, Hiatt, Campos, and Emde (1983) placed 10- to 1 2-months-o I
d
infants in situations that typically arouse happiness, surprise, and
fear. Each emotion was elicited by two different situations. The
subjects' videotaped facial expression was coded with (a) an adaptation
of FACS (Ekman & Frlesen, 1978) and (b) a forced choice of one of seven
emotions (happiness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise, sadness, and neutral
state). Raters produced reliable Judgments without any knowledge of the
context. The authors, however, noted that almost all situations elicited
blends rather than discrete emotions.
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Other authors focussed their research on facial displays in specific
situations. izardet al. examined changes infants' response to acute
Pain (izard, Hembree, Dougherty, & splzirrl, 1983). in this iongitudinai
study, infants were filmed during and after four vaccination Inocu.atlons
occurring between the second and the eighteenth month of the infant's
Ufa. Judges rating infants' facial expressions with the discrete coding
system MAX (Izard, 1979b) reported expressions of interest, anger,
distress, and sadness at all ages. Distress expressions decreased with
age, especially after eight months, while anger Increased in parallel,
individual differences were also observed: infants who were slow to be
soothed expressed anger for longer durations.
In the same vein, Stenberg, Campos, and Emde (1983) studied seven-
month-old infant's reaction to a frustrating experience. The infant was
given a biscuit which was repeatedly taken away and the infant's
videotaped expressions were coded with FAST (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). The
authors concluded that the capacity to express anger is well developed In
seven-months-old Infants and that the expression of anger increases with
the repetition of a frustrating episode.
Another line of research in the development of emotion expression
examines the infant's facial expression during episodes of separation
from the mother. All the studies in this area use the Ainsworth strange-
situation. This procedure is a separation and stranger confrontation
paradigm which has been designed mainly for i nf ant-careg i ver attachment
research (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Infants are placed
in an unfamiliar setting, typically a laboratory room furnished with
toys, where they play with their caregiver in the presence of a stranger.
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After a short tine of familiarization, the caregiver exits the room for a
brief period, usua.iy two to three minutes, ieaving the infant a.one with
the stranger. The caregiver then comes back and p lays aga in wi th the
infant, in a second separation episode, the infant is left totally alone
in the room. infants' facial express ions and behav iors are usua I iy
videotaped during the session and are later rated by a poo. of judges.
Malatesta and her colleagues conducted two experiments using
A. nsworth's procedure with 2.5- to 7.5-month-oid infants (Malatesta, &
Havi. and, 1982; Malatesta, Grigoryev, Lamb, & Cuiver, 1986). Infants
facial expressions were rated with the d I screte decod i ng system MAX
(Izard, 1979b). They found that infants display a large variety of
expressions, Including (in order of frequency): knit brow, happiness,
anger, discomfort, interest, brow flash, surprise, and sadness. In these
studies, no facial pattern of fear or disgust was observed. Malatesta
and her colleagues also noted a linear increase with age in the display
of positive affect, especially interest and happiness, and a
corresponding decrease In (a) the rate of expression changes and (b)
negative affect, especially discomfort and knit brow.
As evidence for early socialization process of emotion, Malatesta
and her col leagues noted in both studies that mothers responded more
frequently with contingent responses to positive expressions and tended
to ignore negative expressions. This trend In maternal responses is even
more marked toward males than toward females. Also, these authors
reported similarities between mother and infant expression in the
preferential use of particular emotion type and particular facial region
(brow vs. mouth) for expression.
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The same procedure has been used with older infants. Fro. data of
the second and more stressfu, period of separation
Procedure, SchiUer,
, za rd, and Hembree (1986) investigated the
ra.ationship
, n 13-month-o.d infants between faciai expression patterns
and type of attachment as defined by Ainsworth (Ainsworth et al., 1978).
infants' facia, expressions were coded with AFFEX
, a coding system which
proceeds by ho .. st I c Judgments of the face (,zard & Dougherty
, 1980)
.
They found that the emotions expressed the most often were, in order of
frequency, anger, sadness, and fear, this latter result being In contrast
to the findings of Malatesta et al.'s investigation of younger children.
Schl.ier et a., aiso discovered a correspondence between faciai
expression and the type of attachment. infants who showed an anxious-
resistant attachment pattern displayed more sadness and less Interest
than Infants In the securely attached group.
Furthering the study of Individual expressive differences In the
strange-situation procedure. Hyson and Izard (1985) demonstrated
individual continuities In anger, sadness and interest expression. They
also found correlations between Infants' expressions at 13 and 18 months
for (a) each discrete emotion, (b) emotion blends, and (c) rate of
expression changes. As a whole, facial expression blends tend to
Increase between 13 and 18 months. Indeed, In 1 .5-years-old Infants,
different emotions are more often expressed simultaneously with separate
regions of the face.
These studies suggest that, with the exception of fear, the whole
range of facial expressions can be observed before the third month of
life. Indeed, disgust, happiness, anger, Interest, surprise, and sadness
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have been reported In two-month-old*xn s. The relationship between facial
expression and context or <?tat«state, however proven for seven-month-old and
older children, has not yet been estabMshed for younger Infants. Pear
seems to appear later, between the seventh and the ninth month, as
observed by Emde. Gaensbauer
. and Harmon (1976).
The above reviewed studies also estahiichd'i> bl s developmental and
•nd, vidua, trends In emotional reactivity. The same s , tuat lon w I M
•licit d.verse facial expressions In different Infants, depending of
their age and Indlv.dua. characterlst.es. with age. the ratio of
Positive over negative emot.ons Increases. Finally, emotional b.ends
become more frequent during the second year of life.
Spontaneous facial display In post-Infancy children
In older children, the major question Investigated Is the extent to
which children communicate nonverbal ly and spontaneously their emotional
state. Children are Induced Into an emotional state by empathic reaction
to a story or a movie which Is presented to them. Ham I I ton ( 1973)
Pioneered this paradigm in a study where he showed 5- to 11-year-old
chl Idren two f I Ims of a model portraying happiness or sadness. Judges
were able to guess accurately the type of film shown from the videotaped
Infants' facial expressions. However, Hamilton did not find effects for
children's age or sex on the judges' performance.
Similarly, Buck (1975) presented four- to six-year-old children with
pleasant and unpleasant slides. Again, undergraduate Judges and
children's mothers were able to guess successfully the type of slide
shown from the children's videotaped facial expressions. In addition,
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Buck noted ,arge Individual differences In sending abilities.
Extraverted chl.dren were m0 re successful senders than Introverted
children. No sex difference was reported.
Felnman and Feldman (1982) used the same procedure wl th s Imllar
subjects. However, they presented slides of four emotions (happiness,
sadness, fear, and anger) rather than two and the slides were accompanied
with comments describing the emotion-arousing situation, in this study,
mothers could only decode happiness and anger better than chance wh i
,
e
undergraduate Judges were totally unsuccessful. Moreover, male children
encoded happiness better than females and females were decoded worse than
chance for anger.
Finally, to induce emotion In their subjects, Schwar tz-Fe I I eman and
col leagues used a different techn
I que wh I ch led to more di f ferent iated
results. In their study, four- to five-year-old children were told
stories inducing happiness, sadness, anger, or a neutral state (Schwartz-
Felleman, Barden, Rosenberg, & Masters, 1983). Judges guessed the type
of story children were told from photographs of the children's facial
expressions at better than chance levels.
In sum, the face seems to carry some information about children's
subtle emotional states as Induced by slides or stories. However, this
information is poorly differentiated and the spontaneous sending accuracy
of emotional information varies greatly among Individuals and types of
emotion. Finally, the fact that parents are better decoders than other
adults of their children facial expressions suggests the existence of
consistent Idiosyncrasies in facial expressive style.
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Voluntary facial expression
Two forms of voluntarily controlled facia, expression have been
studied in children. ,n the former, the subjects have to pose an emotion
of which they receive the label; In the latter, they have to imitate a
model or photograph of a model posing an emotion.
Posed facial expression
in two studies children were asked to pose emot iona i express ions
.
Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979) showed that 2.5- to 5-year-old children
could successful iy pose happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, and
disgust. This ability increased with age for females, while it slightly
decreased for males. Schwartz-Fe I leman and her co I ieagues compared
spontaneous and posed facial expressions. In the same study discussed
earlier, these authors had four- to five-year-old children successfully
pose happiness, sadness and anger (Schwartz-Fe I I eman et al. 1983).
Children's expression of happiness were more recognizable when posed than
when spontaneous but no difference in decodability was found between
spontaneous and posed expressions of sadness and anger.
Imitation of facial expressions
Children's ability to imitate the facial expression of a
photographed or videotaped model has also been investigated. Odom and
Lemond (1972) found that imitative accuracy increases between five to ten
years of age. These results are the opposite of what is generally
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observed for spontaneous facial expression which Is reported to he
Increasingly Inhibited during childhood.
Studying more discrete components of facial expression. Ekman,
Roper, and Hager< 1980, asked 5- to 13-year-old children to Imitate the
facial actions Identified In FACS (Ekman * Fr ,esen. ,978). Children
observed a videotape of a model posing a single act Ion un 1 1 or a
combination of action units. In this study, children's performance also
improved with age or with the help of a mirror or a coach. All children
could express happiness (AU, 2) and surprise (brow raise: AU1+2). Nlne-
and thirteen-year-old children encoded the facial actions of surprise and
disgust, but had difficulties with some facial movements Included In
fear, anger, and sadness.
Investigating Imitative ability at a younger age, Field and Walden
(1982) had three- to five-year-old children Imitate facial expressions In
several conditions: children either received the help of a mirror or did
not, and were or not given the label of the emotion portrayed by the
model.. Children In the Im I tat lon-a lone cond 1 1 ion cou I d per form most
successfully. They encoded, in order of accuracy, happiness, sadness,
surprise, interest, disgust, anger, and fear. The children's ability to
Imitate facial expression was not related statistically to their age or
to spontaneous expressivity during free play. This latter finding Is
contrary to what Lemond and Odom, and Ekman et al. reported In older
ch I I dren
.
In sum, the voluntary facial expression of emotion seems to be
mastered after the spontaneous facial expression. Voluntary facial
expression skills are progressively developed throughout all of childhood
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and even later. As reported by Ekman at ai noam/ cMn e l. (1980), even adults have
problems In voluntarily producina r*r** ln ~j Miua g certain components of common
spontaneous egressions. Also, at all ages, facial expressions of
positive emotions are generally easier to pose or imitate than facial
expressions of negat I ve emot ion. Happiness Is the easiest emotion to
express voluntar My.
Cone I us Ion
in their 1973 review of the literature, Charlesworth and Kreutzer
reported that expression of distress and delight were well developed at
two months of age, anger at six, and that fear appeared sometime during
the first six months (although no precise time of onset could be
determined). Surprise had not been observed before the first year unless
In a weak, attenuated form. The same authors could not cite any
systematic Investigation of the neonates' expressive capabilities. They
also reported that, during childhood, while the occurrence of smiling and
laughing increased with age, the frequency of crying progressively
d im i n i shed
.
Since then numerous gaps have been filled In our knowledge of the
ontogenesis of the facial expression of emotion. Oster and Ekman (1978)
established that the facial musculature is fully formed and functional at
birth. Also, several emotions have now been proven to be expressed
earlier in life than what was reported by Charlesworth and Kreutzer.
Facial expressions of happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise have all





, t consistent ly reported to appear
.ater, between the
and n.nth month. The development of d.screte techniques to decode fad
d-sp.ays (e.g., facs) .ay be responsib.e for detection at an earner age
of the onset of facia, expression in .ore recent research.
,„ preschool
children, spontaneous empathic emotional dispiays have been observed in
response to both adults' and children's facial expression.
Confirming Char I eswor th
' s and Kreutzer's earlier reports, the
expression of positive emotion Increases with age, while the expression
of negative emotion decreases. Later in life, negative emotions are more
difficult to express voluntarily than positive ones. With age, the
emotional blends also develop In frequency and diversity. Finally, the
ability for expressing voluntarily emotion develops later. Preschoolers
can Imitate and voluntarily produce recognizable facial expressions.
However, not until their tenth year can they do this convincingly.
Unfortunately, the studies Investigating young Infants (seven-month-
olds or younger) rarely, if ever, relate facial displays to the context
in which they occur. Emotional states are too often Inferred from facial
expressions without seeking confirmation from converging evidence.
Several authors, however, point to the existence of discontinuities in
the relationship between facial displays and their context (Izard et al,
1980; Zlvin 1982, 1986). The same situation (e.g., the approach of a
stranger) may elicit different emotions and related facial expressions
according to the developmental stage of the infant or to Individual
character 1st Ics.
Very few studies have Investigated such Individual and developmental
trends. Among the few exceptions are the studies of the ontogenesis of
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.m.l.ng
.nd of thi fear of strangers.
„ence
, tha twodomalns „ ^
relationship of facia, expression to Us context and |„dlvldu.l
differences in expressive reactions to a situation remain largely
unexplored, and they may constitute a promising area of research for the
future
Decoding Facial Expression
This second section specifically addresses the ontogenesis of facial
expression decoding skills. We will review the I I terature on the
development of facial expression recognition for different types of
emot ion
Infants' ability to decode facial expression of emotion
A wealth of research using the hab I tuat lon-recogn i t ion paradigm have
investigated young Infants' ability to discriminate among different
facial expressions. With this procedure, infants as young as one-day-old
have been studied.
Typically, infants in this hab i tuat ion-recogn i t ion paradigm are
presented with photographs of faces of different actors posing diverse
emotions. The dependent variable is the amount of time that the infant
fixates on each photograph. From the infant's pattern of fixation to a
series of photographs combining same and different emotions and actors,
the Infant's ability to discriminate between different facial expressions
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is estabilshed. Moreover, glven that infants generally a.lowmore
fixat.on time to a nove. tt
. mu, U8
, one can deduce whether the ,nfant
reacts d.f ferent «a.
,y to a photograph of the sane actor posing a
different emotion as to a novel stimulus. Hants' reactions to
Photographs of different persons are typically used as a control.
The studies using the hab I tuat Ion-recovery paradigm yields
relatively divergent results. Field and colleagues found that neonates
(mean age: 36 hours) could discriminate between facial expressions of
happiness, sadness, and surprise posed by a model (Field, Woodson,
Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982). Using photographs as st imu I I , Bar rera and
Maurer (1981) produced evidence of discrimination between smiling (happy)
and frowning (angry) faces in three-month-old infants. The same results
have been reported in four- and five-month-old by La Barbera, Izard,
Vietze, and Paris! (1976). Studying three-month-old infants, Young-Brown
and colleagues observed that surprise was discr imlnated from happiness
and sadness, and that happiness was discriminated from surprise, but that
sadness was not distinguished from either happiness or surprise (Young-
Brown, Rosenfeld, & Horowitz, 1977). in five-month-old infants, Schwartz
et al. found some evidence of discrimination between angry, fearful, and
sad faces but they failed to establish any differential recognition of
happy, angry, or Interested face (Schwartz, Izard, &Ansul, 1985).
In contrast to Field et al. (1982) findings, Caron and colleagues
did not find differentiation between happiness and surprise before seven
months of age (Caron, Caron, & Meyers, 1982). In this latter study,
while four-month-old Infants did not show any evidence of
differentiation, five-month-olds could discriminate surprise following
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habituation to happ,ness, but not the reverse. Slml ,ar,y, Ne I son
,
Morse,
and Leavm (1979, demonstrated that seven-mont h
-o,ds couid d , f f erent ,a.e
between happiness and fear.
Severa. hypothesis have been proposed to exp.ain these divergent
results. caron et a.. (1982) note that the studies reporting
differentiation in infants younger than six months have a common
methodological characteristic: they use a single actor posing the
different emotions. These studies fail to respond to the question of
whether infants had in fact perceived differences of expressions, or had
differentiated some isolated features having no emotional meaning. This
Interpretation receives support from a study by Oster and Ewy (in Oster,
1981). These authors reported that four-month-olds fixated on
photographs of toothy smiles longer than on photographs of sad faces but
showed no preferences for closed-mouth smile over sad faces.
Schwatz, Izard, and Ansul (1985) propose a more theoretical
explanation. According to these authors, the hab i tuat ion-recogn 1 1 ion
paradigm underestimates the infant's ability to detect differences among
stimuli of different social and emotional signal value. For example, the
angry face of the caregiver may indicate an interruption of the
interaction with the infant and, as such, has an important emotional
signal value, while the sad face of the caregiver may not be predictive
of anything for the infant and thus has no emotional signal value. From
this perspective, young infants would learn to differentiate between only
those facial expressions having social and emotional signal value.
These two hypotheses are certainly not exclusive. However, whatever
virtues or limitations the hab i tuat ion-recogn i t ion paradigm may have, the
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divergent data for a conservative conclusion: There is no strong
evidence of differentiation In the decoding of facia, express, on of
emotion before the age of six m0nths.
data only investigate facia, expression of a very ,, m ,ted range of
emot ion.
Other procedures have also been employed. For Instance, K.innert
(1986) studied older Infant use of emo tiona, facial expression from
adults. One-year-old infants were confronted by unusual toys in presence
of an experimenter expressing happiness or fear. The infants used the
adults' emotional facial expression to regulate their own behavior.
Children's ability to decode facial expression of ftmnti.n
Overall, two main aspects of facial expression decoding skills have
been studied in children. The first aspect concerns ch I I dren 's ab I I I ty
to categorize facial expression of emotion, while the second has examined
their ability to relate facial expression of emotion to a context or a
s I tuat ion.
Categorization of facial expression of emotion
As part of their research Investigating developmental differences in
the perception and production of facial expression, Odom and Lemond
(1972) asked preschoolers and fifth-graders to sort photographs of faces
expressing the eight fundamental emotions of Izard (Izard, 1977).
Children had to match together the persons who "felt the same". The
ability to discriminate facial expressions appeared to improve with age.
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Helton ( 1973
> reached the same conCus, on byasKIng subjects or , h.
same age to pa,r photographs of ,ac,a, egressions with a photograph of a
standard facial expression.
The same procedure has been used bywaiden and Field (1982), who
asKed four- to f iye-year-olds to choose from an array of drawings the
face of the person that "felt the same" as a standard. The drawings of
faces were portraying happiness, sadness, surprise, and anger. The faces
in the choice array yarled on one or more features of the standard facia,
expression, or had Identical eiements. in this study, happiness was
decoded eughtly better than sadness, which In turn was categorized more
accurately than surprise and anger.
In other experiments, children had to label the emotion expressed In
a face represented by a drawing, photograph, or videotape, in a study by
Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979), preschoolers decoded emotions of
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and surprise (listed In order of
accuracy) from Ekman and Friesen's (1976) set of photographs. Overall
decoding skill increased with age. Field and Walden (1982) had three- to
five-year-olds decode videotaped faces of children of the same age
voluntarily expressing emotion. The subjects discriminated better than
chance happiness, sadness, shame, surprise, interest, disgust, anger, and
fear (in order of accuracy).
In two studies, Masters and co I I aborators invest igated ch i idren's
discrimination between happy, sad, angry, and neutral faces (Felleman,
Barden, Carlson, Rosenberg, & Masters, 1983; Re i chenback & Masters
,
1983). In both studies, children had to label photographs of facial
expressions posed by eight four- to five-year-old children. In the first
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study (Felleman et al., 1983) Dresrh^oi «kn«*), p c o l children tended to attribute
emotion to neutral faces more often than nHi.it. xuadults. They were also somewhat
less accurate than adults In recoanl7inng iz g happiness and anger. However,
they were as accurate as adults In reconni 7i ™m g iz ng sadness which may be the
consequence of the children's overuse of sadness as a label.
in the second study (Relchenback 8. Masters, 1983), four-year-olds
and third-graders received or did not receive the help of contextual cues
which led to greater accuracy in labelling the facial expressions. If
there were Inconsistencies between the facial expression and the given
context, younger children relied more on facial expression, while older
children based their judgement on the contextual and situational cues.
Stlfer and Fox (1986) had the same emotions (happiness, sadness, and
anger), encoded by three videotaped models, Ident i f led by preschoolers
and adults. These authors noted responses about chance level at all
ages. Wh I le three-year-o I ds I dent i f I ed the three emot ions at the same
level of accuracy, five-year-olds did better on happiness and anger than
on sadness. Adults, however, recognized sadness and happiness better
than anger.
In sum, these studies confirm that performance in categorizing and
labelling facial expressions of emotion increases with age between three
and seven years. Happiness seems to be the first emotion whose
expression is correctly Identified and the most recognizable at all ages.
Sadness Identification usually emerges second, while the results for
other emotions are mixed. All of the studies reviewed above either did
not find or did not report sex effects.
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Relating facial expression to its context




andKlrouac, Tremb.ay, and Dore C1986)
used a very s.mnar procedure to examine how children could relate a
s.tuation and the facial expression of the person exper iencing this
situation. In both studies, children were told stor les depict Ing
situations which typ.ca.iy arouse one of the s I x fundamenta I emot lons
identified by Ekman. Camras and Al I ison i I lustrated the stor ies wi th
drawings without faces; children had to choose one among three
Photographs of facial expressions posed by a 12-year-old. K.rouac et al.
used drawings of photographs rather than photographs of faces. Camras
and Allison observed that their three- to seven-year-old subjects
steadily improved in accuracy with age. s Im I I ar
I y , i n the study of
Klrouac et a I., seven-year-olds were more accurate than five-year-olds,
but the nine-year-olds did not outperform the seven-year-olds. The
patterns of decoding accuracy for each emotion are somewhat similar in
the two studies. The subjects of Ki rouac et a I . decoded happ iness,
sadness, and anger better than fear, surprise, and disgust, while in
Camras and Allison's study, happiness and sadness were decoded better
than anger, fear, and surprise. Disgust yielded the lowest accuracy.
These data are parallel to the results of the studies on
categorization and labelling. Performance improved wi th age, wi th a
ceiling being reached between seven and nine years of age. Happiness was
more accurately inferred than sadness, followed by anger, fear, surprise,




Cone I us Ion
Based on th. terature review of Char lesworth and Kreu.zer (,973),
It can be conceded that ,
,
ve-mon,h-o
,d infants can d lscr, m ,na,e between
f.Cl.l expressions of happiness, sadness, and anger. No strong evidence
Indicates discrimination at any ear, ier ages
other facial expressions. Charleswor.h and KreuUer aiso reported a
wealth of research on the children's ability to recognize facia,
expression of emotion. Their conclusion was that the children's
performance Increased continuously up to the tenth year and leveled off
thereafter
.
Even though far more research has been done since then and more
detailed findings have been obtained, the same general conclusions still
hold. one- to three-month-old Infants may be unable to discr Imlnate
facial expression because of the Immaturity of their sensory system
(Oster, 1981). Moreover, there is no strong evidence of the
differentiation of facial expression before six month of age. Even for
infants of that age, more experiments involving a wider range of facial
expressions are needed to evaluate more definitively the infant's ability
to recognize facial expression and how this ability develops. The only
consistent finding in the Investigation of young infants Is their
overriding tendency to respond positively (smiling) to the human face,
whatever that face may express.
The research on social referencing has definitively established that
one-year-olds discriminate and use facial expressions displayed by
adults. Preschoolers can match or identify by labelling or telling a
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story different facial expressions at better th„ „di D than chance level, an
ability which improves with age and reach** ay a es a ceiling between seven and
nine years. A consistent nnding „ thtt happ|ness „
expression to be correctly discriminated and,
, hroughout the „„
is the easiest display torecognl.e. Sadness fo, ,ows and the , Indings
are mixed for other fade, expressions. Further research ,tlM has to
investigate beyond mere accuracy level* th« m^>, ,y ' is e mechanisms responsible for
the development of the ability to reconni7« f^i,.-'• l g ze facial expression of emotion.
Learning Display Rules
This third and final section presents the studies investigating
display rules, a relatively new domain of interest in the study of facial
expression of emotion. Display rules are the norms prescribing the
appropriateness of specific facial expressions in a given context. They
determine who can show which emotion to whom, when, where and how.
Display rules may originate from soc io-cu I tura I and/or personal
norms. In both instances, they serve as strategies to regulate emotional
processes. Ekman (1984) have listed four categories of facial expression
regulation by which display rules operate: Individuals can either
minimize or exaggerate their spontaneous facial expression; they can
neutralize it by keeping a "poker face"; or finally, they can substitute
a facial display for another.
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Studies of display rules
saarn, n 978> conducted th. ,„., study dlr6ct|y lnvest lga( |ng ^
development of display rules Inchlldr.n. She presented 6- to 1 0-year-
oldeh.ldr.nwlthp.r.on.1 conflict situations depicted in
•tyl. Pu, w,th photographs of rea! children. In the f,na, frame of each
series, the chUd-actofs face could no, be seen In the photograph.
Subjects had to seleo. from a set of f.cl.l expression photographs the
face which fitted best with the situation. They were also asked to
Justify their choice. Saarnl noted an Increased usage of display rules
with age (e.g.. »lt Is Impolite to show you feel that way") but no sex
d I f ference
.
In a naturalistic study. Saarn. (1984) observed 6- to 10-year-old
children's reactions when receiving a disappointing gift. Younger
children (especially males) were more likely to show negative faces than
older children. From the pattern of her data, Saarnl suggests that the
only difference between sex Is that females are socialized earlier than
males In the usage of display rules. The results of this experiment have
been replicated by Cole (1985). To further Investigate the likelihood
that children were regulating their affective display via some social
norms, Cole (1985) had the examiner remain present with the child In some
case and not In others. Significantly more smiling occurred when the
examiner remained present versus when he left.
Finally, Gnepp and Hess (1986) studied the different developmental
patterns of verbal and facial display rules in 6- to 15-year-olds. The
subjects were presented with eight stories of social interaction and were
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asKed to preset what the protagonist woula „y ^ ^ ^ ^
-ou.a.oo*
,,K.. Th.,hlldr.n.. knowl9dgeof
-otiona, dlsp.ays increased up „ ,„ ^ ^ ^ ^
therearter. Th.e„,.dr.n Mn , t,.t,d acontro|
ru.es at an earner age than tor the
,.„,., expression d, S p, ay ru,es.
Deception and voluntary expression
If very few studies have directly Investigated display rules
their ontogenesis, two relevant and related f.e.ds, deception
voluntary facial expression, have been more extens.ve.y studied. The
research on the voluntary control of facia, expression has already been
reviewed above. Two consistent findings are that the accuracy of
vo.untary facia, encoding Increases w.th age and that positive emotions
are easier to express vo.untarl.y than negative emotions. Research on
the development of deception has been summarized by De Paulo and Jordan
(1982), who concluded that successful encoding and decoding of facial
deception appears between seven and nine years of age and is well
established by the eleventh year.
and
and
Cone I us Ion
In sum, the mastery of display rules parallels the development of
voluntary control of facial expression. After a continuous Increase
until 10 years of age, the display rules knowledge seems to level off.
The present data do not allow any conclusion regarding sex differences.
Unfortunately, no study has yet Investigated how display rules are
acquired, the relative
display rules, or how
emotional processes.
importance of personal
display rules are used
89




Summary of the finding and roMHonshlc bgtwgn -coding and
facial expression
From the above literature review, a general picture of the
development of encoding and decoding facial expression can be drawn. At
birth the neonate already has an impressive capacity for nonverbal
expression a potential which Is used very early m life. By the third
month all the facial display of the fundamental emotions have been
expressed, with the exception of fear that appears by the ninth month.
After the first year spontaneous facial expression is we I I estab I i shed
and seems to undergo very few changes, except for an increase In
emotional blend expression and some modifications in the frequency of
expression of some specific emotional displays. The voluntary control of
facial expression, however, is mastered later. Even though preschoolers
can already Imitate recognizable facial expressions, perfectly convincing
facial displays are rarely produced before the tenth year. The
acquisition of display rules parallels the evolution of voluntary
express Ion.
The results of the research on facial expression recognition are
somewhat more difficult to Interpret. Some evidence seems to Indicate
that six-month-old infants can discriminate different facial expressions
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of emotion and that ono-voar „n *e ye old toddlers understand and use the facial
displays of adults to regulate their behaviorn D . However, a more general
and category, know,edge of ,ac,a, expression of em0 t ion and of its
reiationship ,ospeo,f,c situations „ on, y Sieved iater and m0 re
completely around the eighth year.
Thus, it seems that there is a .ag between the acquisition of the
different nonverbal sK.Ms. While spontaneous facial expression seems to
appear very early in life, vo.untary facial expression and facial
expression recognition seems to be achieved iater. Indeed, Ham., ton
(1973) did not find any difference between the spontaneous facial
expression performances of k I ndergardeners and f I f th-graders. Their
ability to decode facial expression however, signi f icant
.y increased with
age. Odom and Lemond (1972) found parallel results with a similar
population. Their subjects were better decoders than Imitators of facial
expressions and although both performances improved with age, the lag
between decoding and voluntary encoding increased. These two studies
suggest a developmental sequence whereby spontaneous expression appears
first, followed by facial expression recognition, and where voluntary
facial expression is the last skill to be acquired. At the individual
level, it has generally been found that in adults, there is no
relationship between encoding and decoding ability (Buck, 1984).
Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979) confirmed this absence of relationship in
preschoolers.
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Data and Theor les
The degree to which the theoretical mode is presented in the first
chapter are confirmed or
. nva dated by empirical evidence can now be
assessed. a first consideration
,3 that facia, dispiays of the
fundamentai emotions appear eariler than pred I cted by Br I dges ( 1932)
.
Furthermore, the sudden onset of fear demonstrated by Emde et al. (1976)
and the fact that facial expression develops simliary in blind children
(reviewed by Chariesworth & Kreutzer, 1973) and In see I ng ch i I dren
strongly suggests (a) the existence of a biologically given and pre-wlred
set of facial displays and (b) the inadequacy of the progressive
differentiation model. Very soon, however, the facial displays'
repertory Is diversified but this later development proceeds by blending
the fundamental displays rather than by further differentiating them.
The occurence of these blends may have been mistaken by some theorists as
a process of progressive differentiation.
Unfortunately, with the exception of fear display and smile, the
relationship between facial expression and ellcltor, appralsor, autonomic
responses, or subjective experience, remains largely unexplored before 7
months. In older Infants however, some studies have established that the
relationship between ellcitors and facial displays changes over time.
For example, Emde et al. (1976) demonstrated how the elicltors of smile
evolve from a pattern of e I ectophys lo log I ca I activity in the brain to
social objects. Similarly, Izard et al. (1983) showed how pain elicits
different emotional and expressive responses across age. Still, the
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processes determining the evolution of th»e relationship between elicitors
and displays remain to be understood.
The few studies about the acquislt
, on of dispiay rules demonstrate
that, under the pressure of social norms, ch
. ,dren learn to dissociate
their facia, expressions from their subjective experiences. This
capacity evo.ves para. le. to theab.Mty to vo luntar i , y control facial
expression and to the know.edge of the expectat.onsaboutemot.cn.
However, no study has yet Investigated the existsa in xistence of a causal link
between these three capacities.
"n sum, the general model presented at the end of the first chapter
seems to be supported by the emp i r
. ca I
'
data reviewed in this second
chapter. Indeed, fundamental facial displays appears ear iy in Infancy
and are later blended to Increase the diversity of the repertory of
emotional facial expressions. Before adolescence, a part I a I vo luntary
control of facial expression Is acquired and the display rules specific
to the culture are learned.
However, further research needs to Investigate the nature of the
relationships between the diverse components of the model (ellcitor,
appraisor, etc.) and how these relationships evolve over time. More
specifically, the development of the links between ellcitor and facial
expression, and between subjective experience and facial expression,




Remarks on the methodo \ nn i used .^ - ln studying f ac ia i ex£res8lon
deve lopment
.
Most or the methodoioglca. probiems already
and Kreutzer (1973) .til. hamper the recent research. From a
deve.opmental point of view, the most
.mportant handicap „ the absence
of longitudinal studies, with two exceptions ( lza rd et a.., I960, and
Hyson & izard, 1985), al. the comparisons across ages reported ,„ this
chapter were the results of cross-sect lona I studies. This aspect of the
research constitutes a serious obstacle for the attempt to discover a
sequence in the onset of specific facial expressions In decoding
encoding. ,t a. so prevents the study of continuities and dlscont Inult
I
in the re. ationsh.p between facial displays and their contexts. in
addition, lack of longitudinal data hinders the studies of idiosyncrasies
and personal styles in facial expressivity.
Another problem in tracing nonverbal abilities across ages Is that
different methodologies and paradigms are used at different ages and
periods of development, thereby confounding the specific effects of the
methodologies and ages In the observation of performance changes.
Different procedures may also answer different questions, making it
hazardous to relate the findings of studies using different procedures.
For example, links between the results obtained with the habituatlon-
recovery paradigm and with the Dashf I e I d story-te I I I ng procedure are
difficult to establish and interpret.
Unfortunately, too, the distribution of the studies across ages Is
unequal. Nonverbal abilities at certain critical ages still need to be
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explored for a theory or facia, expression deveiop.ent. For exa.ple ,„
this review covering fifteen years of research, no study has investigated
the encoding abilities In 1.5- to 3-vear «ih +^* 3 y -old toddlers, with the exception
of Zuckerman and Przewuzman's (1979) nanf>rnwmj p per. Slml lar ly, only three
studies researched the decoding abilities in one- to three-year-olds.
These gaps maybe due to the absence of a sat i sfy I ng methodo logy needed
to explore the nonverbal capacities of these age groups.
One can also regret the absence of a standard terminology to specify
the emotional states reflected in the facial expressions. For example,
in referring to the same emotional states, various authors employ labels
as different as distress, wariness, or fear, or love, de.ight, p.easure,
or happiness. Although there is a tendency, however, to refer to Ekman's
or Izard's terminologies (which are very similar), it is st i I I unclear
whether these two terminologies can successfully give account of the
young Infants' states.
Finally, the ecological validity of most of the procedures used in
this area of research has often been questionable. "Natural" emotions
are indeed difficult to induce in a laboratory setting in infants as well
as in adults. Yet, the development of videographic techniques provides
easy and reliable decoding of naturalistic observations and ethologlcal
studies have often supported the evidences gathered in the laboratory.
Thus, future research has to trace more systematically developmental
trends across ages. New methodologies still need to be developed to
permit the study of unexplored age groups and to allow comparison of the
results across ages. Ideally, longitudinal designs should be used.
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Still, so™
, mportan, rn.thodo.oglc.. progresses have a, ready been
made. The most , mportant one I. def,n,„ve, y the develops, of standard
and d.sorete techniques for decoding fada, express.on and the adaptation
of these techniques to Infants' and ch, Idren's facia, expression. The
FACS techn.que of Ekman and Fr ,esen ( ,978, has been adapted by Oster
(1981) to decode neonates' facia, expression.
, zar d' s (1979b) systems>
MAX and AFFEX, have also been used successful
,y with Infants. These
techniques, Increasing, y „,dely used by researchers, constitute an
important step toward the standard Uat Ion and comparability of the
results of the numerous facial expression studies currently produced.
CHAPTER III
FACIAL EXPRESSION AND SOCIAL SKILLS: THE PRESENT STUDY
Social Skills and Facial Expression
Both common sense and the psychological literature suggest that the
ability to identify others' feelings and to appropriately express one's
affect would be an Important factor In determining the social adaptation
of an individual. Indeed, emotion recognition and expression are central
to in a number of social activities. For example, nonverbal
communication of emotion plays an Important role in empathic responding
and more generally In the maintenance and facilitation of social
Interaction (Camras, Grow, & Rlbordy, 1983; Feldman, White, & Lobato,
1982)
.
Thus, the ability to correctly encode and decode facial expressions
of emotions can be considered a social skill that must be, at least
partly, acquired and develop during ontogenesis. Social skills generally
refer to the complex set of behavioral and cognitive skills that are used
to direct and facilitate social behavior (Eisler & Frederlksen, 1980).
The Importance of social skills at a young age has been stressed by
different studies establishing a relation between social skills In
childhood and later interpersonal adjustment In adulthood (VanHasselt,
Herson, Whitehill, & Bel lack, 1979; Combs & Salby, 1977). For example,
children who have had poor social relationships with their peers later
demonstrate a greater rate of delinquency (Roff, Sells, & Golden, 1972)
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Numerous deficits in facia, expression encoding and decoding may
contribute to hinder socia. adjustment. At a first ,evel, some
individuals may have fai.ed to .earn the disp.ay ru.es of the.r cu.ture
and, as a consequence, are
.ncapab.e of appropr i ate




ays norma I i y determined by the social context.
It is also possible that, although they know the display rules, some
individuals do not apply them as they per form the I r behav ior . For
example, they can fall to accurately Identify the context or to relate it
to the display rules. Finally, some persons could also be lacking of the
motivational incentive to conform to the display rules.
At another level, low socially skilled individuals may be
Insensitive to nonverbal cues and not use the Information provided by
others' spontaneous facial expression to adjust their behaviors to social
interactions. The Intensity and frequency of facial displays may also be
inappropriate and generate uneasiness In social Interaction.
In sum, numerous aspects of facial expression can be considered as
social skills whose acquisition determines the social competence of the
individual. Hence we postulate that there are i nter- i nd i v i dua I
differences in expression and recognition of emotion and that these
differences contribute to the general social adaptation of these same
individuals.
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Facial Expression as Social Skills: Empirical Evidence
Studies aimed at establishing a relationship between social skills
and nonverbal competence in adults have often been inconclusive. For
example, Goldenthal (1985) asked female undergraduates from a dorm, rated
by their peers as highly or poorly socially skilled, to pose Ekman's six
fundamental emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, disgust, and
anger). No difference in portrayal ability was found between the two
groups. Similarly, Sternberg and Sm i th ( 1 985) f a i I ed to estab I I sh a
relationship between decoding skills in nonverbal commun I cat ion and
several standard psychometric-type tests of social intelligence.
Moreover, studying nonverbal sensitivity in an interview situat ion,
Christenson, Farina, and Boudreau (1980) noted that even the low social
skilled subjects accurately perceived and described nonverbal cues from
their partner, although they failed to adapt their behaviors to these
cues as high social skills subjects did.
On the other hand, similar research in children has yielded clear-
cut and contrasting results. In the studies of the development of facial
expression of emotion in preschoolers described in the previous chapter,
Field and Walden (1982) found a positive correlation between children's
ability to express eight basic emotion and their sociometric rating.
Similarly, Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979) observed that preschoolers'
adjustment to school was related to their capacity to express and
recognize happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, and fear.
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Parana, r.su,'ts have Peen ,ound ln research us|ng Q|dBr
For exa.ple, Edwards, Manstead, and McPonald (1984) had th. soc,ometrl=
status of 8- to n-y.ar-o,d. assessed by their class.ates.
were then presented with Euan's photographs of faces portraying
happiness, sadness, fear, disaust ann«r
,
u g , ge , and surprise, and they were
asked to match a label from a given list with each photograph presented.
High sociometric status children outperformed low soc iometr i c status
ch I I dren
.
In a similar procedure, Zabel (1979) compared the performance of
elementary and junior high students either from regular schools or from
special schools for children with emotional and behavioral problems.
Overall, children from regular schools d I d better than ch i I dren from
special schools, although the accuracy for happiness was identical for
the two groups, and junior high students from the special schools were
more accurate for anger and sadness than students from regular schools.
In a study by Feldman, White, and Lobato (1982), normal and
emotionally disturbed adolescents were shown a series of scenes designed
to evoke emotions that were positive, negative, and neutral in character.
While viewing the scenes, subjects' reactions were videotaped so that
judges could later determine their expressive skills. Subjects' degree
of social competence was assessed by their teachers. Later, as a measure
of decoding skills, subjects were asked to determine from the videotapes
of persons exposed to the same scenes the character of the emotion evoked
by each scene. Subjects high in social skills and normal subjects were
better encoders than subjects low in social skills and emotionally
disturbed children. Similarly, In the decoding portion of the study,
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normal adolescents were more , rMlr!lt „ 4 „accurate than emotionally disturbed
adolescents.
More recently, using a similar encoding/decoding procedure, cuetrlnl
(1987, showed videotaped clip, eliciting anger, disgust, tear, happiness,
and sadness «o 9- to 12-year-o,d children.
,„ thl , stuay
, fema|es^
low in social skins were less accurate both In encoding and decoding
than females high in soc i a I sk I I I s
.
The performance of the males was
Identical In the two groups.
In conclusion, a good deal of evidence supports the hypothesis that
the ability to decode and encode facial expressions of emotion is related
to social skills, at least in ch I Idren and adolescents. The discrepant
findings between adults and children may be explained by the fact that,
with the exception of Goldenthal (1985), studies in adults were not
investigating expression of emotion
, but rather nonverbal communication
in a more general sense. Moreover, Goldenthal investigated only posed
facial expressions, and the results might be different with more
naturalistic spontaneous facial expressions. It is I ikewise possible
that nonverbal skills are less critical for social competence in adults
than in children. Indeed, while children typically are expected to
display most of their emotions, In most circumstances, adults usually are
supposed to conceal their feelings.
In sum, while experimental evidences are inconclusive for adults, in
children the ability to encode and decode facial expressions of emotion
seems to be related to various measures of social competence. Evidence
supporting this relationship has been reported in both normal children
and atypical children populations.
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The Present Study
To date, no investigation of preschoolers' abilities to recognize or
display facial expressions of emotions has yet been done which also
d.rect.y assesses their degree of social competence. While there Is some
pertinent data, they are peripheral to other aspects of the studies In
which they were collected. For example, Field and Walden (1982) and
Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979) report correlation coefficients from
studies which used only very approximate or imprecise measures of social
skills (sociometrlc rating or school adjustment).
In the present study, preschoolers were directly assessed as being
low or high in social competence using a standardized measure. These
subjects were then compared in their accuracy on both their encoding and
decoding abilities for several facial expressions of emotion.
To assess their decoding abilities, children were shown a series of
videotaped scenes which typically evoke happiness, sadness, or fear, in
each scene, a character, whose face was blackened out on the television
screen, was experiencing the emotion appropriate to the situation. The
children were asked to choose the face that best fit the character in the
given situation from an array of three photographs of faces expressing
happiness, sadness, or fear. In order to rate their encoding abilities,
the children's faces were filmed while viewing the emotional scenes.
Later, from the children's videotapes, judges determined which emotion
was portrayed In each scene being attended to by the children.
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Congruent with the experimental findings reviewed above, itwas
predicted that, overall, high socia. *„,. chl ,dren wou.d outperform ,ow
social skills children for both encoding and decoding. Further
predictions were derived from previous research reviewed in the second
chapter. These studies reported evidence suggesting that preschoo.ers'
decoding performance improves between 3 and 5 years of age (Zuckerman |
Przewuzman, 1979; Stifter ft Fox, 1986; Field ft Wa.den, 1982; Schwartz-
Felleman, Barden, Carlson, Rosenberg, & Masters, 1983). However,
spontaneous expression was found to be stable in preservers (Feinman ft
Feldman, 1982; Hamilton, 1973; Zuckerman ft Przewuzman, 1979). Hence, It
was predicted that while decoding performance would improve with age,
encoding performance would remain stable.
Finally, specific predictions about the decoding performance of the
different emotions were formulated. As unanimously reported by the
studies reviewed in the second chapter (e.g.
, Field & Walden, 1982;
Zuckerman & Przewuzman, 1979), happiness was predicted to be the easiest
emotion to decode. Previous research, however, does not yield clear-cut
prediction for fear and sadness. Thus, no specific prediction was made
concerning these two emotions.
In sum, they were three hypotheses:
(a) Overall, the highly socially skilled preschoolers should
outperformed the poorly socially skilled preschoolers for both encoding
and decoding;
(b) The general performance should Improve with age for decoding,
but remain equal for encoding;
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(C) Happiness was „p.et,d be easier to decode than fear and





Thirty-eight subjects were recruited from the classrooms of two
preschools In a small New England town and from birth lists compiled from
public town records. A letter explaining the procedure and purpose of
the study was mailed to the parents of all children aged 3 to 5 attending
the preschools or randomly selected from the birth lists. Parents were
subsequently contacted by phone and, for those Interested in
participating In the study, an appointment was arranged for them to come




who were run individual ly, received toy
stickers for their participation. There was an approx imat i ve
I y equa
I
number of subjects for each of the three age groups-12 three-year-olds,
13 four-year-olds, and 13 f i ve-year-o I ds—wi th an equal distribution of
males and females in each age group.
Experimental Materials
Emot lona I scenes
Nine 10- to 20-second videotaped silent scenarios, with three for
each category of emotion, were constructed. Each videotaped cl ip
consisted of a short scenario presenting an adult character in a setting
that typically evokes a specific emotion. The script of each scenario
was designed so that preschoolers could understand it and empathize with
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the adult character. For ftYamm^example, one movie presented the character
receiving several presents at his birthdav n=,rtwo y party, a situation in which he
would be expected to display happiness.
in a pilot test, each videotaped dp was presented to a panel of 20
undergraduate students who were asked to rate the category of emot ion
depicted in the movie. Only cIIds vlaMinn , „
'
CMp y |e| aing interjudge agreement of 95%
were selected for the study.
To train the subjects for the procedure, movies similar in nature to
the experimental dps were created. These movies depicted non-emotional
situations that are nevertheless associated with specific non-emotional
facia, patterns. For example, the character was shown fa I I I ng as I eep
,
displaying a typical sleeper's face: eyes closed and relaxed facial
muscles and the subjects were asked to choose the face flting the
character from among three photographs of faces, one of which was a
sleeper's face.
Photographed faces
Facial expressions were presented to the subjects in form of 10 X 12
cm. glossy black and white photographs. Each photograph showed the face
of an adult male model posing a facial expression of one of the three
emotions studied: happiness, fear, and sadness. The model was instructed
to perform the facial actions described by Ekman and Friesen (1978) as
prototypical of each of the three emotions. To be selected, a photograph
had to be Judged typical of an emotion by two judges trained to the FACS
coding system (Ekman & Friesen, 1978).
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For training of subjects, photographs of
Pr9Sentln9 ^ m°del POrtr^ ln3 the Afferent non-emot iona I faCa.
displays appropriate for each training seen* Phrtt„9 cer|e- Photographs of two square
wooden objects were used as distractors.
Quest lonna I re
Subjects were assigned to either the high sociai skills group or to
the low socia. ski. Is group based on their score on the Social Competence
scale of the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist (Achenback & Edelbrock.
1982). This scale assesses a child's performance in areas such as peer
and family relationships, participation in organized groups, and
recreational activities from parental responses to a series of
questionnaire items. Within each age group, subjects were divided by a
median spilt into two groups demonstrating either above- or below-average
levels of social competence.
Decoding Procedure
Subjects accompanied by a parent were tested in a laboratory room in
a university psychology building. The room contained a low table and two
small chairs of the type generally used in a preschool classroom, as well
as an armchair, a black and white television monitor, and a false
speaker. Inside of the speaker was a camera used to record the subjects
reactions to the movies. The camera's location enable the filming of a
frontal view of the subject's head and shoulder. Also, a wooden box of
15 X 20 X 40 cm. with three small drawers was placed on the low table in
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front of the chair facing the television screen th* „^a . The v I deorecorders were
operated from an adjacent room equipped with a two-way mirror.
The parents were asked to complete the Parental Consent Form and the
items of the Social Competence scale of Achenbach Child Behavior
Checklist. Meanwhile, the children were
that they were about to play a game in which they could win stickers.
They would see several movies on television depict ing a man whose face
would not always be seen. The ch I I dren were to I d that their Job was to
choose among several photographs the face most appropriate for the man in
the situation depicted in the movie. After having ensured that the
children understood, the experimenter asked them to p i ck the st i ckers
that they would like to win from a large selection.
A progressive training technique designed to teach the procedure to
the subject was then begun. The subjects were first shown the non-
emotional movies. After viewing a scene, they had to choose among three
Photographs the face that fit the character
. Three photographs were
displayed on the top of the wooden box. The children were told that the
drawer under the correct face contained a sticker and that they should
pull the drawer under the photograph they thought to be correct. Thus,
stickers were used to reinforce each correct trial.
To allow progressive shaping, the difficulty of the task was
Increased after each successful trial. First, the face of the character
was seen in the videotape, and the subjects simply matched the
appropriate face. Later, the face was masked and the subjects again had
to pick the appropriate face In an array of three photographs. Also, the
children first had to choose between a photograph of face and two
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distractor photographs of Irrelevant objects- later th«. h «JBCl
'
,
ey had to choose
among three faces. The training was considered hy « s> to be accomp I i shed when
the subject correctly matched one nf thr^ *n a o three faces with a scene where the
character was masked, three time in a row.
in contrast to the training phase, the senarios in theactua.
experimenta. task were on.y presented once, aiways with the character
masked, and the subject had to choose d i rect
. y from an array of three
Photographs the appropriate face. More specifically, the subjects were
presented with the nine emotiona. scenarios in an I dent I ca
I
, f i xed
randomized order, with the exception that no more than two st imul
I
representing the same emotion was permitted to occur sequentially. After
each senario, the experimenter displayed the three photographs of facial
expressions of happiness, fear, and sadness in a random arrangement
.
Again, the subjects were asked to determine which face would be
appropriate for the character in the situation depicted by the movie. In
the case of a wrong answer, the experimenter removed the incorrectly
chosen photograph and asked the subject to reconsider his or her choice
with the two remaining photographs. Once a trial was completed, the
subject were praised and given a sticker to reinforce his or her
participation and motivation. After the experimental task, the child and





The subject's reactions to the nine scenarios were secretly fHmed.
These videotaped reactions were edited in 5-sec. segments corresponding
to the peak emotional period of each scene. Three hundreed and six dips
were obtained, 36 of them being eliminated for technical reasons. These
segments were arranged on two new videotapes In a partially random order,
subject to the restriction that no more than four serial segments could
consist of the same subject or of the same category of emot ion. Each
videotape contained half of the total number of segments.
Thirty two undergraduate students from a large state university
volunteered to rate the videotapes. In compensation, they received class
extra credit or a small amount of money. Each videotape was shown to 16
judges who had to determine from the filmed face of the subject which
emotional categories was being displayed. Judges were offered a forced





Each subject received three scores, corresponding to each category
of emotlon mvest, gated. The scores consisted of the total number of
correct Initial choices (choosing the appropriate facial expression at
the first trial) over the three emotional scenarios, and ranged,
expressed as percentage, from 0% to 100%.
The main analysis consisted of a 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 mixed design analysis
of variance. There were three between subjects factors
, soc I a I sk I I I
s
(high and low), sex, and age (three-, four- and f Ive-years of age) , and
one within subjects factor, category of emotion (happiness, fear , and
sadness)
.
The results of the analysis of variance are presented In Table 3. A
significant main effect due to social skills was observed, F(1,26) -
7.09, p < .02. As expected, the high social skills subjects, who
averaged 79.7 percent correct responses, proved to be more successful
decoders of facial expression than the low social skills subjects, who
scored an average of 68.7 percent correct responses (see Figure 4).
A significant main effect for age, F(2,26) - 10.94, p < .0005, and a
significant main effect for emotion category, F(2,52; - 33.50, p < .0001,
were also observed. Post hoc comparisons using the Duncan New Multiple
Range Test (Duncan, 1955) were employed to determine the nature and
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Effect of Social Sk " is on the Accuracy of Recognition
of Facial Expression
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direction of the significant variations itnations. it appeared that overall the
decoding accuracy or the four-year-oids c78 . 7 percent) and ^^
year-olds C83.3 percent, was
, l9n,f ,e,nt
,y g rea«er « han « h, accuracy of
the three-year-olds (60.3 percent), p < 05 (S(1B Tahl „
—
-
us se<s Table 4). However, no
significant difference was found betwesn t h„ ,o e the four- and five-year-olds.
All age groups performed s Ign I f I cant I y better than chance, p < .05.
Examination of the mean accuracy scores for the different categories
of emotions showed that happiness was most accurate, y decoded (95.7
Percent,, fo, lowed by fear (79.0 percent,, w.th sadness decoded leas,
accurate, (50.0 percent,. Post hoc anaiysls revealed that these three
means were
., significantly different from each other and from chance
level (33 percent)
, p < .05.
The main effects for age and emot ion category were mod I f led by two
interactions revealed by the analys.s of variance: an interaction of age
and sex, F(2,26)
- 8.92, p < . 005
,
and a three-ways i nter act ion of
category of emotion and sex and age, F(4,52) - 4.00, p < .01. No other
main effects nor Interactions were found to be significant. The
interaction of sex and age is illustrated in Figure 5 and the cell means
are presented In Table 4. While the males' performance is stable between
three and four years, and improves at age five, the females' performance
increases between three and four years and then declines somewhat at age
f ive
It should be noted however, that this interaction between sex and
age is modified by the further three-ways interaction between category of
emotion, sex, and age. This effect is illustrated in Figure 6, and the
cell means are reported in Table 5. It appears that the difference
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TABLE 4
Mean Accuracy Scores as a Function of Sex and Age (%)
3-year-old 4-year-old 5-year-old OVERALL
Fema les 54 0a 92 .7b 81 3b 76 0
Ma les 66 6a 64 7a 83 3b 71 5
OVERALL 60. 3 78 7 82 3 73 7
(Similar subscripts Indicate nonsignificant differences between means.)
FIGURE 5








3-year-olds 4-year-olds EH 5-year-olds
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TABLE 5
Mean Accuracy as a Function of Ac* <?ovt ge, Sex, and Emotion (%)
3-year-o.d 4_year _0)d 5_year.0 , d
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Happiness 87.3de 83.3cde 100.0e 96 . 0de lOO.Oe i 00 .0e
Fear 54.0bc 70.7bcde 89. Ode 80.7cde 90.3de 89. Ode
Sadness 20.7a 46.0ab 89 . 0de „.» 54
. 3bc 66 , ?bcd
(Similar subscripts Indicate nonsignificant differences between means.)
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FIGURE 6












Femaies/Happ H- Males/Happy * Females/Fear a Males/Fear
Females/Sad Males/Sad
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between males an. females ,„ decoding fae|a , ^^ ^
responsible of , h. over*,, interaction betwesn ^ ^ ^ ^
hoc analysis did not reveal arw hi**ny difference between males and females In
decoding happiness and fear. For sadn»« kdness, however, the developmental
Patterns seem different for males and females. WhMe females
dramatically improve their performance from chance level at three-years
of age to an accuracy of 89, at four-years (p <
.01), males- performance
remains at chance leveis between three- and four-years of age, and
increases at five-years (p < . 05)
. „ shoula a|s0 6e^ ^ ^
performance of thefe.ales in decoding sadness sign I f ican,
,y decreases
between four and five vear fn ^ nn\ +~y (p < . 05) to a score that does not differ
significantly from chance level.
The performances of the various groups of subjects according to
their sex, age, and category of emot ion were a I so tested aga inst chance
ievels. It appeared that subjects in all groups performed better than
chance level for all categories of emotion with the exceptions of both
male and female three-year-olds for sadness, the female three-year-olds




To analyze the type of decoding errors made by the subjects, a 3 x 3
contingency table comparing the accurate response with the response given
by the subjects was constructed (see Table 6). It appears very clearly
that while happiness was correctly identified most of the time, fear was
almost exclusively mistaken with sadness ( 1 - 16.37, p < .001) and
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TABLE 6
Children's Choices as a Function of the Correct Choices (%)







Sadness o3 47 51
OVERALL 31 38 3-1
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sadness with fear ( 1 - 44.10, p <
.001).
The genera! pattern of the results suggests that the ab.Uty «o
recognize faP, a, expression developed a, different
"cording to the specific ercotion being decoded. „ seems that children
may firs, iearn
,0 discriminate happiness from fear and sadness, but
confuse these two latter expressions. In a second stage, chi idren
accurately Identify both happiness and fear while mistaking sadness for
fear. Finally, in a third stage, al, three emotion are decoded
accurate I y
.
To test this hypothesis, the children were c lass I f led into one of
eight categories according to their successes or failures in identifying
each emotion (see Figure 7). To meet the cr i ter ion of successfu I
identification for a given emotion, a child had to have at least 2
correct trials out of three for this emotion. Supporting our hypothesis,
most of the children fell In one of the three patterns corresponding to
the three stages, leaving the five other categories empty. Because the
expectancies for some of the eight categories were close to 0, no
statistical test could compare this pattern of d I str i but ion of the
subjects with a chance model. Therefore the eight different categories
were collapsed into two groups, group A with the subjects falling in the
three categories predicted by our hypothesis and group B with the
subjects falling in the other categories. The difference between these
two groups was consistent with the hypothesis, with 36 of the 38 subjects
classified in group A ( 1 - 120.40, p < .0001).
To further test the developmental aspect of this pattern, the age
differences of the children classified in each of the three stages were
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FIGURE 7
Age and Distribution of the Children as a Function of their
Patterns of Responses in the Decoding Portion of the Study





+ - at least 2 out of 3 trials correct for a given emotion category
- - less than 2 trials correct for a given emotion category
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examined with t-tests. It aDDear* »*.«pp s that significant age differences, In
the expected direction, are found between st,«.i a9e I (mean age: 3.4) and




' £ < -005, and between Stage II
manage: 3.S) and Stage ,,t ( 29). 1
. 70l ,p < . 0,
between Stages I and





Three accuracy scores corresponding to the three categories of
emotion investigated were computed for each subject. These scores
represented the percentage of Judges that were ab.e to identify the
emotion category depicted in the scenario from the subject's facia,
expression while he or she was viewing it.
The main analysis consisted of a 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 mixed design analysis
of variance. There were three between subjects factors
, soc i a I sk i I I
s
(high and low), sex, and age (three-, four- and five-years of age), and
one within subjects factor, category of emot Ion (happ i ness
, fear , and
sadness)
.
The results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table 7.
Only one factor, category of emotion, appears to be significant, F(2,46)
- 3.87, p < .05. Post hoc comparisons using the Duncan New Multiple
Range Test (Duncan, 1955) indicated that while there were no significant
differences between subjects displaying sadness and fear, or between
sadness and happiness, happiness was encoded with a significantly greater
accuracy than fear (p < .01). These results are presented in Figure 8.
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Social Ski I Is
Age x Sex
Social Ski l Is x Sex
Age x Social Ski I Is




Emot Ion x Sex
Emot Ion x Age
Emot ion x Social Ski I Is
Emot ion x Sex x Age
Emot Ion x Sex x Social Sk i
I
Emotion x Age x Social Sk
M

















2 1655 43 3 .87
2 221 83
.52
4 428. 95 1 .00
2 523. 19 1 .22
4 434. 22 1 .01
2 292. 69 68
4 284. 70 66
4 124. 72 29
46 428. 29
* p < .05
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FIGURE 8
Encoding Accuracy as a Function of the Category ofEmotion
Mean accuracy {%)
Chance Level
Happiness H Sadness II Fear
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T-tests were coated for each emot,on to determine whether judges
performed better than chance „vel. ,t appears that wh, ,. the Judges-
accuracy for fear did not differ f rom chance, happiness (,(35, . 3.28, p




were identified by the Judges
at better than chance levels.
As predicted, no effect of age could be observed. There were no
other significant maln effects or interactions found to be significant on
the analysis of variance.
Encoding errors
To determine the type of errors made by the judges, a 3 x 3
contingency table comparing the expected response w.th the response given
by the judges was constructed (see Table 8). It appears that the judges
were more likely to mlsidentify happ iness wi th fear rather than wi th
sadness ( 1 - 10. 39, p < .005) and to m i s I dent i f I ed sadness with fear
rather than with happiness ( 1 =. 26.73, p < .001). The errors made in
identifying sadness did not differ from chance level. The results
obtained with high social skills children as senders were compared with
the results obtained with low social skills children. No difference was
found in any of the cells of the contingency table.
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TABLE 8
s as a Function of the Correct Choices (%)
Emot Ion Attended to
by the Ch I Idren
Emot on Chosen by the Raters
Happ i ness Fear Sadness
Happ i ness 45 .6 32.2 22.2
Fear 29 7 35.1 35.2
Sadness 24 0 35.1 40.9
OVERALL 34 9 32.5 32.7
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Relationship between Encoding and Decoding
The correlation coefficient betw^^n th. ,D ee the average accuracy for
decoding and for encoding all thrp« om« +"8 n ee emotions appeared not to be
significant (r
. .08, t<33, .
.47, ns.,. slmllariy> correlatlon




The data analysis iargely confirms the three
hypothec. As predlotedi high|y soou||y 8kmed preschoo|ers
outperformed poorly socially sk i,,ed preschoolers, at leas, In ,he
reeofln.t,on of facia, expression, of emotion. |„ tota, support of the
second hypothesis, while emotional expressivity remained equal between
three- and five-year olds, the decoding performance of both groups
improved with age. Finally, preschoolers round that happiness was indeed
easier to Identify than fear, with sadness being the most difficult.
Social Competence
Consistent with previous observations by Field and Walden (1982) and
by Zuckerman and Przewuzman (1979), highly socially skilled preschoolers
did outperform their poorly socially skilled peers in decoding facial
expression. Moreover, this effect of social skills is strengthened by
the fact that it was independent of age, sex, or emotion category and
that it was obtained in a normal population of children from middle-class
fami I ies.
The idea that social skills and the ability to recognize facial
expression are related has already been established In older children and
in adolescents (Custrini, 1987; Edwards, Manstead, & McDonald, 1984;
Zabel, 1979). However, the present study is the first to demonstrate a
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similar relationship in preschool-age chMdren, thus
existence of a direct reiationship between social skills and facial
expression recognition in children as young as three-years of age.
Given the correlational character of the experimental design, the
causa, direction of this relationship cannot be determined,
.ndeed,
several possibilities regarding causation are plausible. a first
possibility would be that some individuals do not learn to discriminate
nonverbal cues or to use them as information about the states of their
social partners. As a consequence, they have difficulties in relating
and "tuning" into others, and show poor social competence. Conversely,
it may be that because of their soc i a I wi thdrawa
I , poor I y soc i a I I
y
skilled individuals miss the opportunity to be sensitized to nonverbal
cues and to differentiate facial expressions. F i na M y , it is also
possible that both social competence and the ability to recognize facial
expressions of emotions are related to some general factor encompassing
affective and social skills which would determine the adaptation of
individuals to their social surroundings.
To further examine this relationship, future research could
investigate whether improving the nonverbal sensitivity of children poor
social skills children also affects their social competence. Such
research would have the double advantage of addressing practical concerns
as well as theoretical considerations. The broad concept of social
skills could also be broken into more specific concepts whose
relationships with facial expression decoding skills could be examined,
leading to a more precise definition of the observed effect of social
skills. For example, It could be determined whether the ability to
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recognize facial expressions is related to th» ,i i a e frequency or type of
interactions with peers of the «M a^r same age group rather than with adults.
The hypothesis that there would be a hi**ia do difference in emotional
expressivity between high- and low-sociaiiy ski Med preschoolers was not
supported by the present data.
better the category of emotion displayed in the scenarios when observing
the facial expressions of high as opposed to iow social *„,. chi ,dren.
It should be noted, however, that the overall accuracy of the Judges was
low; this measure may not have
between high and low socially skilled individuals.
Moreover, the facial expression of the character experiencing the
emotion in each scenario could not be seen, a character ist ic of the
stimuli that may have diminished their emotional impact. Indeed, the
viewing of facial expressions of emotion has been proven to be a potent
ellcitor of affective and mimicry reactions (Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1977).
Future research could investigate the d i f f erent i a I f ac i a I react ions of
high versus low social skills preschoolers viewing emot iona I ly loaded
scenarios where facial expressions would be displayed. a recent
investigation by Custrini (1987), where the subjects were viewing
emotional scenarios with visible facial expressions, in fact did find a
difference of expressivity between highly and poorly socially skilled 8-
to 13-year-olds.
Still, judges were able to decode children's reactions to happy and
sad scenarios at better than chance levels. Hence, the children at both
levels of social competence did successfully express at least some
affective states. This suggests that if there is a difference in
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emotion., „pr.„,v„y between high and low soc|a| „„„ ^
has been undetected ,„ th. present ^ ^
As p ropOSed In the conc , uslon Qf ^ ^
spontaneous
,„,., expressions of emotion are i.rgely determined by
biological and maturat iona I factors Th«„ ...l . They thus constitute a "given" more
than a l-to-be-acqu I red"
.
However, they can he modified hy display
rules which are progressively learned during childhood.
,f, as suggested
by some authors (e.g., re, dman, White. & uobato,
,982,
, poor ,y soc ...
,y
.klU.d ,nd,v,du.,s suffer from learning deficits. It should be expected
that, in preschool-age children, spontaneous emotional expressivity,
which is largely Independent from learned display rules, would no. be
differentiated between highly and poorly socially skilled children.
Age Conslderat ions
The second hypothesis was fully supported by the data. While the
performance for the recognition of facial expressions improved between
three- and five-years, spontaneous expressivity was not related to age.
It should be noted that no prev ious study that has invest Igated th Is
particular age range found an improvement of the decoding abi I it ies.
This finding, then, validates the sensitivity of the present procedure.
It also supports the Idea defended in the conclusion of Chapter ll,
namely, that the recognition of facial expressions and the knowledge of
their relationships to specific situations are learned during the early
years of ch i Idhood.
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s
Converse,,, spontaneous expressivity was not r.,.tM to age Th|
""^ SU9fl6StS
expressions arereiatlve
.dependent of , Mrnlng that
and that, once established, they undergo few changes.
On the other hand, the differences of decoding
,Dllltl98 reiated to
age were modified by an lnt«r^ti™ k .interaction between emotion category, sex, and
a9e. Aithough the ,eve, of performance was noteworth,
,y no, Infiuenced
» -x ,n Itseif, females appeared to develop their decoding
,K, , „
year. The recogn i « Ion of sadness fi ts th Is pattern par, icuiar ,y we, I
.
This differentiated trend Is congruent „i, h deveiopmenta, patterns noted
in severe, studies In which males show delays In th. recognition facia,
express,on (Buck, ,984, and ,n soc,a, and intellectual development in
genera, (Maccoby & Jack, in, ,974). Th,s finding further supports the
Idea that the recognition of facia, expression of emotion ,s learned
during ontogeny and is related to the genera I cogn 1 1 1 ve and social
development of the Individual. Surprisingly, though, females'
performance in recognizing sadness In the present study droped at five-
years of age, a finding which is not easl ly explained. Because only
three subjects of the sample are responsible for it, this effect may be
spur ious.
Findings Related to the Emotion Category
As predicted by the third experimental hypothesis and comparable to
previous findings, happiness was the easiest facial expression to
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recognize for the preschoolers Even thro.t three-years-olds Identified it at
levels better than chance. However mnt., contrary to the findings of two
previous studies (Camras & Allison iqr^ v^* , 1985; Kirouac, Tremblay, & Dore,1982)
which have investigated similar age grouos s.dn...y 9 ° p , a ess appeared to be more
difficult to recognize than fear.
However, methodological differences may account for the discrepancy
between the Present study and previous research.
studies presented verbal.ythe emotional scenarios, the present study
used more re.Net I c videotaped scenes.
, t seems reasonable to assume
that sadness, elicited by less materia, and visible factors (the loss of
an affective bond or love object) would be more difficult to infer in
real life than fear. In contrast, the ellcltorfor fear (a frightening
object or agent) is usua.ly present and visible in the situations that
evoke fear. This factor may have been missed by studies relying on a
verba, description of the emotional context. The present study, then,
which uses more naturaMstlc stimuli, probably offers a better assessment
of real life performances of preschool-age children.
The results also suggest a stage-like developmental pattern where
the capacity to recognize certain facial expressions is preceded by the
capacity to recognize other facial expressions. More specifically, the
abl
I
ity to recognize sadness Is preceded by the ability to recognize
fear, which follows happiness recognition. Given the type of errors
made, it also seems that children first could discriminate the positive
expressions (happiness) from the negative expressions (sadness and fear)
and later were able to differentiate the two negative expressions.
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Children's reactions to hapDy scenarion p narios were easier to identify than
their reactions to sad scenarios, with the frinht .
.
nn frightening scenarios yielding
no detectable reaction. Several author* hs s have suggested that early m
life spontaneous expressions of neaativ* ^t,g e emotions may be discouraged by
various practices of the caregivers Malat9sta
, ^ &
Culver, 1986; Felnman and Feidman.
, 982)
. Congruent „„„ ^ ^ ^
results of the present study indicate that the
expressive displays varied as a function of their social
Finally, as generally reported (e.g. Buck H-„-,w.y , d , ias4), decoding and
encoding sKMIs appeared to be unrelated. Agaln
, thls finding supports
the idea that the determinants for encoding and decoding facial
expressions are different, the former being shaped by bloioglca, factors
and the latter by leaning processes.
Cone I us ion
This study demonstrates the existence in preschool-age children of a
relationship between facial expressions recognition and social
competence, a relationship already establ ished by previous studies in
older children and adolescents. The present piece of evidence is even
strengthened by the fact that the effect of social skills was observed in
a normal population and is not modified by other variables.
The fact that this relationship has now been established in very
young children further suggests that the def ic I ts of poor ly soc la I I
y
skilled individuals might be acquired early in life. To partially test
this hypothesis, a follow-up longitudinal study could examine if there Is
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any covariation between social competence an* , ,d facial expression decoding
across ages,n tne same lnaivlduals
. Siml ,ar n y . , he nature oftM Sre ,a tI onshipshouldbe morenarrow|y def|nedby re|aung
skills to specific social skills.
Future stupes cou.o a,so ,nvest, gate , t thes9
extend to cMnica, popu.a.ions Known for thelr
competence. For exa.p.e. a s ,udy uslng
. slmMar ^^
the performance of preechoo,-age au„st,c chM.ren w„n n0rma, chl.dren
of similar Intellectual and verbal level.
The present results aiso indicate severa. developmental patterns in
the ability to recognize facial expressions. Overall, this ability seems
to increase with age in a stage-
1 i ke manner i n wh i ch the ab i ,
. ty to
identify particular facial expresses of emotion
,s preceeded by the





I nterpretat Ion of the results of the present study is
M-nitedby the cross-sectional character of its design. The hypotheses
and interpretations formulated above should be further tested in studies
using longitudinal designs.
Thus, the present findings are consistent with the conclusions of
the two first chapters. The changes found in the recogn 1 1 ion of f ac I a I
expressions are congruent with the notion that there are learning
processes that operate during childhood. in contrast, spontaneous
expression of emotion seems to remain largely unchanged up to five-years
of age. At this age, children should develop their knowledge of display
Future studies could Invest igate poss ib I e def i c I ts of poor ly
ru les
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M I to he answered. Do individuals
*'th poor soda, competence remains poor decoders of facia, expression
across ages? Could a training of sens 1 1 1 zit inn t80 8| tl a lo to nonverbal cues of
affect Improve their social competence? Do some r.m.° o clinical populations
suffer a similar deficit? Ar« th«r- «m«*e there different patterns of development
for males and females In the ability to recognize fada, expression of
•motion! is this ability quired through a succession of stages?
From a more genera, perspect.ve. this study could constitute a first
step toward a much needed but ntin mio,i n„ ^si i ii missi g developmental model of the
recognition of facial expression. A3 pre3entod
findings suggest several developmental patterns Involving the
interactions of various determinants such as sex, age, or category of
amotion displayed. S.mllar.y, up to this time, no evidence of an
improvement of the decoding performance between age three and five and no
evidence of a stage-like acquisition for the different categories of
amotion has yet been reported. Future research st I .. has to fur ther
establish and elaborate these results.
Moreover, the novel procedure designed for this study has proven to
be sensitive to subtle differences of performance In decoding facial
expression that In other studies have gone undetected. Very recently
this procedure has also been used successfu I I y at a pre-test stage wl th
younger children (two years of age) and with preschool-age aut 1st Ic
children. Hence. It seems that with minor adjustments such as adapting
the stimuli to the age of the target population, the present procedure
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cou, d be used to ga t her ,„ a centre, I* and standardized way datg qr ^
development of facia, expression recognltion among , ^
ranging from preverbal children to adolescenta i . The traditional
methodological pitfall of changinq the tvn*mg n ype of procedure with age would
thus be avoided.
Finally, at an applied and clinical leve I. the present procedure
could be developed
,„ a test assessing children's
ability to decode facia, cues of emotion. This tes, could constitute an
early detection of possible deficits In sensitivity to nonverbal
emotional information and a basis for compensatory training, ,n typ.cal
as well as In clinical populations.
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